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ABSTRACT 
 
When Do Their Casualties Count? Exploring Wartime Decisions that Pit Security 
Against Harm. (December 2009) 
Dwight Andrew Roblyer, B.A., Texas A&M University; 
M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nehemia Geva 
 
This dissertation offers a new understanding about wartime decision making in 
the face of likely, but unintended, harm to foreign civilians. It empirically identifies 
conditions under which leaders in democratic nations are more or less likely to choose to 
attack a target when confronted with a dilemma between pursuing national security 
objectives and avoiding civilian casualties.  
An innovative targeting decision model was constructed that described both the 
theorized structure of the decisions inputs and the process by which these inputs are 
assembled into a choice. The model went beyond the normal target benefit and civilian 
casualty cost considerations of proportionality to also include the contextual input of 
prospect frame. Decision makers were expected to address the same benefit and cost 
differently depending on whether they were winning or losing the conflict. This was 
because the prospect frame would influence their risk attitudes, as predicted by prospect 
theory. This model was then tested via two decision-making experiments that used 
military officers and defense civilians as participants. Additionally, a statistical analysis 
 iv
of data collected from an extended period of the second Intifada was done to seek 
evidence that the model also applied in actual wartime decision making.  
All three tests supported portions of the targeting decision model. Higher target 
benefit and lower civilian casualty estimates increased support for the planned attack. 
Prospect frame influenced decisions in the cases where both target value and the civilian 
casualty estimates were high and the resulting dilemma was very difficult. In these 
situations, those told that their forces were losing the conflict were less sensitive to 
humanitarian harm and more likely to support the attack than when they were told their 
side was winning. Furthermore, the Intifada data analysis of attacks approved by Israeli 
officials against Palestinians found this same effect of prospect frame held generally 
across all six years of observations.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION:  
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DILEMMAS IN WAR 
 
Civilian casualties in the course of warfare are taking on greater importance in 
world affairs. This is evident in multiple ways. Matters of justice in how a state’s army 
conducts warfare have been codified by international agreements such as the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols. Treatment of civilians in wartime has been taken 
up as a raison d’etre by high-profile organizations such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross. Consideration of just behavior in warfare has been reinvigorated by 
contemporary scholars such as Walzer (1977) and numerous others. Incidents of civilian 
deaths and injuries during war have proven to be magnets for U.S. and international 
media attention. Additionally, large civilian casualty counts have caused some nations to 
plea for, and others to institute, new technologies and tactics for fighting intended to 
spare more civilians, even at the cost of achieving other goals.  
One result of this heightened attention to civilian casualties in wartime is that 
world leaders, the militaries they command, and the publics who keep them in office are 
considering new options and priorities in how a war is fought. Within democratic 
contexts, choices are being made regularly in cabinet rooms and command centers that 
consider a tradeoff between gaining a target’s benefit toward national security and 
exacting a cost by harming local civilians in the environs of the strike. Fresh evidence 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Political Science Review. 
 2
has recently appeared pointing to new priorities and a more pronounced emphasis on 
reducing civilian casualties in the Afghanistan war against the Taliban. The new U.S. 
commander of American and NATO forces characterized his redirection of the war 
effort in Afghanistan as emphasizing the protection of civilians from violence instead of 
the number of enemy combatants killed (Shanker 2009).  
Such behavior poses a puzzle: Why do democratic governments care about 
creating civilian casualties in distant war zones? The classic military-realist purpose of 
war is to win. General William T. Sherman’s famous assessments equating war with hell 
and necessary cruelty is a commonly held conservative opinion as to the most direct path 
for a nation to follow en route to victory. Nevertheless, the civilian and military officials 
within democratic governments are increasingly engaging in attack or do-not-attack 
decisions based in part on harm posed to local civilians. Accordingly, this dissertation 
will focus on developing new understanding about wartime decision making in the face 
of likely, but unintended, harm to foreign civilians. Under what conditions are officials 
in democratic governments more likely to choose to attack or not when confronted with 
a wartime dilemma between pursuing national security objectives and avoiding civilian 
casualties? If fighting in a foreign land among a foreign people, when do their civilian 
casualties count enough to outweigh the security benefits sought through an attack? 
As part of the routine target planning process, potential harm to foreign civilians 
is a major consideration for the U.S. and other governments with strong democratic 
values. However, it is also not the only consideration, nor does it always dominate the 
decision. In a subset of targeting situations, the risk to noncombatants is both significant 
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and known in advance, but the attack proceeds because the target is considered to be of 
such great importance. The account below illustrates one possible outcome from such a 
risk-filled situation. 
 
 
June 19, 2007: U.S. special operations forces were targeting the leader of 
al-Qaida in Afghanistan—one of the organization’s top commanders—
when they launched an attack against a compound that killed seven 
children Sunday in Paktika province of eastern Afghanistan… According 
to several officials, and contrary to previous statements, the U.S. military 
knew there were children at the compound but considered the target of 
such high value it was worth the risk of potential collateral damage. 
(Miklaszewski, Kube, and Windrem 2007) 
 
 
 
While civilian casualties are not an unusual occurrence in war, they are often 
expected in contemporary warfare to be accidental, unforeseen, and unintended. The 
attack described above highlights a different kind of situation where civilians were 
known to be in harm’s way before the target was approved—a situation that is likely to 
become all the more common whenever combatants operate in the midst of 
noncombatant populations. This problem of fighting in close proximity to civilians is 
clearly apparent in other theaters, both past and present, including Israeli operations in 
the Occupied Territories and NATO operations in Serbia. 
These conditions set up a dilemma for national leaders and other government 
officials. On one hand is the pressing need for victory over an adversary. On the other is 
a commitment toward minimizing harm to civilians in wartime, founded in the 
democratic beliefs in the universal rights of life and liberty. Both of these objectives are 
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admirable and highly prized, but in these exasperating situations, decision makers must 
often sacrifice one to achieve the other—they must “do bad” in order to “do good.” 
Yet, there is a significant absence of scientific investigations into these decisions 
in the face of dilemmas between national security and humanitarian harm. Until recently, 
political science scholars had largely studied only the effects of a state’s own military 
casualties on decisions regarding war (Page and Brody 1972; Mueller 1973; Gartner 
1997; Gartner 2008; Sullivan 2008). Some general insights arising from these studies 
may be helpful in looking at the effects of civilian casualties, but these previous results 
are not expected to apply wholly to a state’s consideration of the spilling and the sparing 
of blood other than its own.  
Within the last 10 to 15 years, political scientists have also begun to consider the 
role of wartime civilian casualties in both the interstate and counterinsurgency contexts. 
Some researchers have looked at the causal factors of large numbers of intentional 
civilian deaths in war (see Rummel 1995; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Valentino, 
Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006; Downes 2006). Only 
recently have studies looked at the causes and effects of both intentional and 
unintentional civilian casualties (Downes 2007; Bennett 2008). Yet these studies have 
drawn their conclusions primarily at the state level of analysis without considering the 
role of the individual decision makers who have made the choices that determined the 
state’s actions. They have been directed at refining institutional theories using only the 
characteristics of the resulting historical events, forcing inference of the choice 
considerations and process that led to these results. Also, these studies largely have not 
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addressed the cases of unintentional, but foreseeable, civilian casualties on the opposing 
side of the conflict. Furthermore, the decision process associated with these choices has 
not yet been explored.  
This dissertation seeks to address some of the numerous unknowns surrounding 
this pressing issue of considerations of humanitarian harm within wartime decision 
making. First, it does this through developing an innovative model that moves beyond 
the traditional rational choice assumptions. The model describes targeting decision 
inputs and outcomes. It also addresses how individuals make targeting choices. The 
distinction that people, not states, make these decisions is all the more important when 
the available choices place deeply-rooted values in direct conflict, as often occurs in 
targeting operations. Second, this investigation tests the decision-making model using 
multiple methods, levels, and national settings. Two experiments bring to bear not only 
their inherent power to clearly infer causation, but also the expertise and experience of 
American senior military officers and defense civilians as decision-making participants. 
A statistical analysis of historical observations then tests the model using events from the 
second Intifada gathered into an original data set. The analysis checks for a relationship 
between the lethality and location of Palestinian terror attacks in Israel and the number 
of civilian casualties resulting from Israeli military operations.  
The report of the investigation will be broken down into six additional chapters. 
Chapter II will briefly review pertinent literature in several areas that influence the 
pursuit of this research question. In conflict studies, it will focus on the relationships that 
researchers have uncovered regarding casualties of all types and war. Because the Just 
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War tradition is the basis for many of the concepts and vocabulary of international law 
and policy regarding treatment of civilians in wartime, the chapter will draw from 
writings about the application of Just War principles in order to characterize important 
considerations in the decision process of interest. Next, the chapter will include a 
discussion of rationale and role of studies that focus on decision making at the individual 
level of analysis. This form of international relations (IR) scholarship offers distinctly 
different insights than the more-popular traditional analytical approaches that study 
national-states within an international system. Finally, the review of literature will 
highlight political scientists’ findings and advice regarding the use of prospect theory to 
describe decision outcomes in political settings involving risk. 
Chapter III will provide a description of the decision-making theory upon which 
the study was based, present the model developed and the research questions it 
engenders, and briefly overview the rationale and methods selected to test the model. 
Central in this chapter will be two theoretical views of the model: one to explain 
decision outcome, based on prospect theory, and the other to explicate the choice process 
using the fundamentals of the Cognitive Calculus model (Geva, Mayhar, and Skorick 
2000). Two experiments built around an airstrike target planning scenario and involving 
over 320 military officers and defense civilians were the primary means of investigating 
both views of the model. Additional evidence was also gathered using historical 
observations associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict commonly known as the 
second Intifada. 
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Chapters IV-VI will both provide further details of the research instruments, 
discuss the specific hypotheses that were tested, and document the results of the 
associated analyses. The first two of these chapters will discuss the two experiments 
sequentially, followed by a chapter reporting the statistical results arising from the 
Intifada investigation. Finally, Chapter VII will summarize the findings in relation to 
theoretical expectations, draw conclusions, and look ahead to the future program of 
research. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
At least four areas of scholarly research and thought provide important 
foundations and background for this study. First, this chapter will look at the 
relationships documented by political scientists between conflict and military casualties. 
Second, it will expand this to include the investigations of civilian deaths as they relate 
to conflict. Next, writings about the Just War tradition will be considered as they assist 
in defining the security-harm dilemma that is at the focal point of this dissertation. This 
will be followed by an explanation of the place of individual-level theorizing and 
analysis in the overall body of IR scholarship. Finally, prospect theory will be discussed, 
with emphasis on its ability to incorporate the context of decisions and the resulting 
influence on the risk attitudes of individual decision makers, as well as the challenges it 
may pose in the investigation. 
 
CONFLICT STUDIES ON MILITARY CASUALTIES 
Ever since the era of the Vietnam conflict, IR scholars have debated the 
significance of a nation’s military casualties in its calculations of the costs of war and the 
ensuing impacts on politics. The following paragraphs will first highlight the studies 
which have found that military casualties matter in a significant way. A survey of some 
of the studies that disagree will then follow. 
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Mueller’s 1973 book, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, was the first to 
report a highly significant role played by military casualties in the sensitivities of the 
public and as a check on otherwise-aggressive state leaders. Since then, several 
contemporary studies have refined and extended Mueller’s findings.  
Looking at patterns of casualty occurrences and their affect on the public, 
Gartner and Segura (1998) showed that the manner in which casualties accumulate is 
tied to the amount of public opposition they generate. They emphasized that accelerating 
rates of loss in the very recent past, and not just the log of the overall cumulative count 
of casualties, was significantly related to drops in public support for war. The same team 
also found that the public’s reaction was not sensitive to the race of the casualties 
(Gartner and Segura 2000). Several other studies have looked at the impact of military 
casualties on decision makers and their future political prospects. State-level casualties 
affected both candidate policy positions and election outcomes during the Vietnam War 
(Gartner, Segura, and Barrat 2004). More recently, U.S. casualties in Iraq were shown to 
have depressed vote shares for President Bush in 2004 and prevented a decisive election 
victory (Karol and Miguel 2006). Most recently, Gartner (2008) connected recent 
casualties, longer term casualty trends, and the interaction of both measures to public 
support for war.  
However, other researchers have pointed to additional factors that can exert 
greater influence, under certain conditions, in determining public support for war. At the 
height of the Vietnam war, when approximately 100 American military members were 
dying each week, Page and Brody (1972) found that voter policy preferences regarding 
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Vietnam could only account for 1 or 2% of the variation in votes in the 1968 presidential 
election. Since then, an increasingly vocal opposition has offered their own evidence that 
other factors can temper and dominate military casualties. Looking at data on political 
and media activity and at public opinion polls, Larson (1996) found that the U.S. public 
regularly determined their support of a war using a cost-benefit calculation—not just by 
counting costs alone. He noted that the American people had been more willing to accept 
high casualty rates over the previous 55 years whenever they found a consensus of 
support among their political leadership—an indication that the benefits were worth the 
cost.  
Jentleson (1992) and Britton and Jentleson (1998) argued similarly that the aims 
of a war were the most significant drivers in determining how much military casualties 
counted in U.S. public support. Their results showed that casualty tolerance was usually 
very high whenever the purpose of a war was to defend the United States or a key ally. 
However, when the military objectives were humanitarian in nature, a relatively few 
number of casualties could result in a rapid drop in support. Missions of this last type 
were seen as ventures that were not worth the cost. Focusing on a state’s commitment to 
its wartime aims, Sullivan (2008) found evidence that military casualties are also the 
most important measure of the commitment of a state to its objectives in a conflict. 
Hence, both the public’s sense of national commitment and their concern about the costs 
of withdrawal from the war can lead them to persevere in their support despite the 
military casualties. 
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Kull and Ramsay (2001) and Feaver and Gelpi (1999; 2004) concluded from 
their own research that public perceptions of probability of success drove U.S. public 
support for war. Their measures were not based on how individuals thought American 
forces were faring at that present time, but were strategic assessments of whether or not 
the country would eventually achieve its overall goals via the war. Gelpi, Feaver, and 
Reifler (2005) then went on to test several of the most commonly proposed factors head 
to head—military casualties, elite support, and war objectives—as well as others. They 
concluded that, while military casualties mattered, the most prominent driver of public 
support for war were two indicators of its potential benefit, or lack thereof. The leading 
driver was the probability of eventual success, followed by beliefs about the rightness or 
wrongness of the war. Yet, Voeten and Brewer (2006) found evidence of a direct 
connection between casualties and success, with increased casualties driving aggregate 
perceptions of success, which in turn impacted presidential approval. 
This ongoing debate highlights the prominence of military casualties as the key 
determinant of perceptions of the cost of prosecuting a war, but also that those costs do 
not always hold sway in determining the outcome of decisions about the conflict. 
Highlighted here have also been the importance of the potential benefits of war, which 
are likely to be weighed against those costs. However, the questions of whether and how 
foreign civilian casualties might also enter into cost considerations of this sort remains 
unanswered by the research program focused on military casualties.  
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CONFLICT STUDIES ON CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 
Early empirical work on civilian casualties focused primarily on deliberate and 
institutional harm to civilians by governments at times other than war. Of academic 
interest to these researchers were instances of mass murder, genocide, and various other 
forms of repressive behavior. Rummel (1995) gathered data pointing to the deaths of 
nearly 170 million civilians at the hands of various governments and found evidence that 
democracies were less likely to commit such atrocities. This effect of democracy on 
repression of civilian groups was further investigated and refined by Davenport (1999) 
and Davenport and Armstrong (2004). These results were consistent with common 
expectations arising from the liberal values associated with democratic regimes. 
Other political scientists have looked at the intentional killing of civilians during 
war. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004) studied mass killing in all kinds of wars 
and concluded that the difficulties of fighting against guerrilla insurgencies could cause 
regimes to choose to attack the civilian populations. They reasoned that this outcome 
was related to the fact that guerrillas often drew their support from the surrounding 
population. Another team modeled the intentional killing of civilians in interstate wars 
and found, on average, that previous international commitments to avoid such harms had 
no restraining effect on mass killing by governments (Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006). 
Additionally, according to Valentino, Huth, and Croco (2006) and Downes (2006), 
insurgencies, costly and protracted conflicts of attrition, and wars of conquest were most 
likely to devolve into atrocious and lethal behaviors toward civilians.  
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Furthermore, the exact role of democratic regimes in these actions remains in 
dispute. Valentino, Huth, and Croco (2006) found evidence that the liberal norms of 
democracies were insufficient to regularly restrain these states from engaging in counter-
civilian warfare. Eck and Hultman (2007) reported that autocracies are much more likely 
to engage in mass killing. Yet Downes (2007) provided evidence that democracies 
exhibited a stronger probability than any other type of regime to kill more than 50,000 
civilians in wars between 1816 and 1945.1  
Downes (2007) also expanded his analysis to run a related model that estimated 
the intensity of all civilian deaths in war that were directly caused by the belligerents on 
both sides, a measure of fatalities that was expanded beyond the measures used by 
previous researchers. In particular, this dependent variable included civilians who were 
unintentionally killed in the course of an attack on a military target—what is frequently 
referred to as “collateral damage”—between 1816 and 2003. Using this model, Downes 
tested a wide range of hypotheses and found further support for the prominent 
contributing role of wars of attrition, longer war durations, higher military casualties, 
and more aggressive war objectives in producing higher numbers of civilian fatalities. 
His results also strongly supported the position that democracies kill more civilians than 
non-democracies do when involved in wars of attrition. 
The results that have arisen primarily from analyses of intentional killings of 
civilians in war may also point to interesting considerations in the study of unintentional 
                                                 
1 The firebombing of Hamburg and the dropping of the atomic bombs in Japan were examples of single 
operations during World War II by the British and/or Americans that resulted in at least 40,000 civilian 
deaths on their own. 
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civilian casualties proposed here. This expectation is bolstered by the results of Clarke, 
et al. (2009, 136), who found evidence of real political costs associated with civilian 
casualties. Their analysis of British voters during the most recent war with Iraq found 
that negative news, as indexed by cumulative civilian casualties, prompted a 27.5-point 
decrease in the balance of approval ratings for Prime Minister Blair. Collectively, these 
previous studies highlight the sometimes ineffective restraint of international 
commitments, the uncertain role of democratic norms and practice, the danger of 
prolonged and costly wars, and the strong tendency under certain conditions toward 
seeking victory regardless of the cost in civilian lives. Lastly, the Cook et al. study 
points to political costs that can be associated with the fallout of civilian casualties in 
modern war. 
 
JUST WAR AND THE LAW OF WAR 
Of late, the standards against which wartime behaviors of governments are 
commonly judged are the normative principles of the Just War tradition and the legal 
edicts of international humanitarian law (Walzer 1977, Hensel 2008). These standards 
have been discussed and analyzed by philosophers and social scientists with renewed 
vigor since the start of the second half of the twentieth century (Orend 2006). Together, 
the Just War tradition, from a moral standpoint, and international humanitarian law, from 
a legal perspective, describe for governments and their forces the wartime behaviors to 
which they are to aspire or avoid. These guidelines are of particular interest here because 
they not only discuss intentional acts of harm against civilians, but also unintentional 
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ones. Thus these standards can be reasonably expected to play a prominent role in a 
democratic government’s wartime decision process that involves risk of harming foreign 
civilians.2 The key normative and legal principles of interest in this study will be 
highlighted here further to set the stage for a theoretical decision making model. 
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars (1977) has been noted by many as the hallmark 
of a renewal of broad academic interest in matters of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, 
or the considerations of the ends which justify going to war and the means by which to 
fight justly (see Rengger 2002). The Just War tradition arose from the writings of 
Ambrose, Augustine, Suárez, Vitoria, and Grotius, among others, to serve as an aid to 
practical moral reflection about war. However, it has since been systematized and 
formalized in part into binding international agreements commonly known as the law of 
war (Hensel 2008, Rengger 2002).  
At the foundation of this body of law is permission to attack enemy military 
targets and a prohibition against attacks on civilians or civilian objects3 as intended 
targets (Roberts and Guelff 1989, 414-420). The concept of military necessity is the 
starting point of this permission. As used in the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, it dictates that a 
target be both legal and advantageous toward victory in a “concrete and direct” manner 
(Roberts and Guelff 1989, 420).4 The concept of discrimination in the objective of an 
                                                 
2 While also noting the conclusion of Valentino et al. (2006) with respect to the fact that their study found 
international agreements had no overall restraining effect on intentional mass killings of civilians in war. 
3 Includes facilities such as schools and hospitals when they are being used in their normal civilian 
functions. 
4 A more stringent standard for necessity would require that there exist no other way to accomplish the 
associated military objective. This is similar to the way last resort is used in the jus ad bellum standards of 
the Just War tradition (see Cohen 1989, 64). However, the more pragmatic standard based on legality and 
advantage is common usage in the law of war and in ethical discussions today (see Walzer 1979). 
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attack between that which is military and that which is civilian as is also an essential 
component of this permission. However, this admonition, is made ever more complex in 
application because of the intermingling of combatants and noncombatants on the 
modern battlefield. The law also lays out a principle of proportionality as it forbids 
attacks that are expected to result in harm to civilians that is excessive with respect to the 
“concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (Roberts and Guelff 1989, 415-
416).  
The cases where complete discrimination between combatants and 
noncombatants is impossible and civilians or civilian objects are expected to be 
threatened by an attack against an authorized enemy target are the most difficult. 
International law expects these situations to be considered according to the principle of 
double effect, requiring states to weigh the anticipated contribution toward victory 
resulting from attacking a specific combatant target against the humanitarian cost of 
whatever amount of death, injury, or damage against civilians and their property is 
expected (see Walzer 1977, 152ff). The law of war insists that the attack should proceed 
only if this comparison of proportionality finds the likely benefits outweighing the costs.  
While there are numerous discussions of how these criteria should be used in 
practice, the following order relates the way this research expects them to be applied: 
 
• Determine if the target is legal and advantageous toward victory 
(militarily necessary). 
• Develop an attack plan. 
                                                                                                                                                
Nevertheless, Christopher (1994) asserts that the definition of military necessity is one of the problems in 
international law today. 
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• Estimate civilian casualties. If this is non-zero, recognize a double-effect 
situation. 
• If double effect, search for alternatives that lower or eliminate the harm, 
if military necessity permits. Time, resources, or other factors may 
prevent or shorten this search if the target is to be attacked at all. 
• Whatever attack option emerges from this process, either because it was 
the best of an exhaustive search or the initial option because there was no 
time for consideration of alternatives, is then subjected to the 
proportionality test. 
• Given a double effect situation, if the benefit of a militarily necessary 
target is determined to be proportional to the collateral harm, it can be 
legally approved for attack. 
 
 
 
However, there have been numerous criticisms of the practicality and sufficiency 
of these standards. These are important to consider, given the important role played by 
proportionality determinations and double effect in this decision-making research 
project. Walzer (1977) argued that the necessary comparison of the value of a military 
objective against that of innocent human lives was so fraught with moral peril that the 
best way to ensure a just outcome was for a state’s own forces to accept additional risk 
of military casualties in order to reduce the likelihood of harming civilians. Other 
philosophers, ethicists, legal scholars, and social scientists have since added their own 
perspective to the challenge of complying with the proportionality standard in the face of 
double effect (Gardam 1993, Fenrick 2001, Crawford 2003, Kahl 2007).  
Most recently, Smith (2008, 144) highlighted the central role of risk in these 
considerations of proportionality, which he framed as states effectively “trading civilian 
lives for military advantages.” Couching the issue as one of economy of risk, Smith 
described a zero-sum process of risk allocation made by subtle calculations. He pointed 
to the ambiguities of the law of war and the lack of an unbiased measurement tool, such 
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as Holland’s hypothetical “proportionometer” (2004), as likely to allow these 
determinations to operate in the interest of the state’s military rather than that of the 
foreign civilians (Smith 2008).  
Decision makers charged with making these choices involving simultaneous risk 
to both national security and the lives of civilians operate in a normative gray area 
bounded by the “unmistakably lawful” and the “unambiguously unlawful” (Schmitt 
2002). In this realm democratic governments and their agents frequently tread during the 
course of waging war. Because comparisons by individual decision makers of options 
involving high levels of risk will be key in defining the decision model of this process, 
the upcoming final two sections will first place the analysis of individual decisions 
within the context of IR scholarship and then highlight some of the literature on the 
primary theory that focuses on individual decision making under conditions of risk. 
 
DECISION MAKING AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN IR 
Since the end of World War II and with the rise of Realism, IR theory has 
primarily revolved around the interaction of nation-states. Hudson (2002) explains that 
this focus on Realism, combined with the rise of Scientism, has been the foundation of 
the effort to discover the general laws that governed state behavior. As a result, states 
have been studied within the international system in which they existed and their 
differing capabilities and characteristics have been expected to determine their behavior. 
Empirical data has been collected and statistical or mathematical models have been 
derived. The result has been generalized explanations of state behavior at the systems 
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level, mostly based on input-output models that have been tested with ever-increasing 
rigor and used to generate the mainstream of IR theory. 
However, there have been other IR scholars who have believed that answers of 
great significance were also to be found within the “billiard balls” and “black boxes” 
that represented nation-states within systems-level analyses. Instead of looking at IR 
from the top, a “bottom-up” approach was needed (Chollet and Goldgeier 2002, 153). As 
early as the 1950s, models were being proposed that keyed, instead, to the decision 
makers who acted and were acted upon (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002). This approach 
drew heavily on the foundations of social cognition and its insistence on the intervening 
role of the organism in perceiving the stimulus and issuing the response (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991, 10). To the advocates of this individual-level of analyses, the people who 
have been so routinely absent from IR theorizing have been the actual agents behind the 
structure (Hudson 2002). In this way, the human decision maker should be viewed as the 
“ground” of IR, just as every science has its “ground,” or foundational level, at which 
studied phenomena occur at basic levels (Hudson 2005, 1). 
If individual decision makers were to assume a more primary role within IR 
scholarship, the assumptions and generalizations about the behavior of states had be able 
to be traced back to the real-world factors and considerations that influenced the 
individual choices of the humans. This was done through a focus on the decision makers 
as the object of analysis. Studying decision making in this way led to models that were 
more complex, incorporating any number of considerations from psychology, history, 
sociology, economics, and individual characteristics (Snyder, Brucker, and Sapin 2002). 
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Yet, while decision-making research has produced key insights and some core, 
generalizable propositions, Chollet and Godgeier (2002) assess that these efforts to 
understand the essence of decision-making processes of humans will continue to be hard 
fought and unlikely to be won. They continue, however, that this state of affairs is 
similar to the probability of systems-level theorists deriving the general theory of 
international politics that they so earnestly seek, even at the more abstract level at which 
they labor. While some would acknowledge a theoretical divide between the groups of 
scholars who use the system-level and decision-making approaches, there have also been 
efforts to build bridges across the divide (see Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott 2004). 
This dissertation, by nature of its core puzzle, will focus on individual decisions 
as a means to understand targeting behavior during the system-level event of war. This 
level of analysis stands in contrast to almost all of the research cited in the earlier 
discussions of studies of military and civilian casualties. Thus, this approach faces new 
challenges, but also offers new promise. The following section will explain some of the 
background behind a theory of individual choice under the conditions of risk that is 
central to the research. Following this, Chapter III will explain the two views of the 
individual-level model used to develop the hypotheses of decision-making behavior. 
 
RISK, FRAMING, AND PROSPECT THEORY 
Among the IR scholars who study individual-level phenomena, one manner of 
thinking about risk-laden decisions has been to draw upon prospect theory, developed by 
psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Like its expected utility cousin, prospect 
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theory models individuals as rational decision makers who understand the connection 
between their goals and the option they choose and who seek to maximize the 
satisfaction they receive from that choice (see Jones 1994, 37). Unlike the expected 
utility paradigm, however, the prospect approach considers the ordering of an 
individual’s preferences to be variable, influenced by the decision makers’ current 
prospects for future success or failure (Boettcher 1995, Levy 1997, Bueno de Mesquita 
and McDermott 2004). Driving these prospects are not the present net asset levels of 
individuals’ resources, but the perceived resource levels’ distance above or below a 
significant reference point (Levy 1992a). According to prospect theory, this perception 
leads individuals to operate from within either a frame of gain or of loss.  
Under the influence of these frames, decisions are often made differently than 
would be predicted by considering only the expected costs, benefits, and probabilities of 
the available choice options. Decision makers who perceive themselves in the frame (or 
domain) of gain are often risk averse and will act more conservatively when they would 
otherwise be expected to be more willing to gamble to further improve their position. 
Similarly, individuals making choices in the domain of loss are likely to become risk 
takers. This mindset results in a willingness to gamble in order to make up for losses 
when the situation would otherwise seem to dictate conservative behavior to protect 
against additional loss. 
Jones (1994) explains that preferences—assumed to be invariant by rational 
choice, yet quite malleable under prospect theory—are not pure, but mixtures of two 
different types. Individuals may prefer an object of choice for itself or because it is a 
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means to obtain something else they value. This “something else” can include 
intangibles, such as a sense of self-esteem or style. Furthermore, the objects of choice all 
have multidimensional attributes, only some of which are incorporated into any single 
choice. Because people are bounded in their rationality, they are selective in their 
attention and only consider the aspects they consider important at the time and disregard 
the rest (Jones 1994; Simon 1977, Simon 1985). 
Said another way, prospect theory states that the context of a choice exacts 
powerful influence over decision makers and the option attributes upon which they will 
focus. Frame is the common label for that context within decision theory. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) theorized that the first step in decision making, consisting of 
framing and editing, was to make a preliminary analysis of the problem. Framing 
affected how reality was perceived and information managed and evaluated. This 
depended on the manner in which the problem was presented and on the individuality of 
the decision makers, including their norms, habits, and expectancies (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986). During editing, common components across options were cancelled 
out and alternatives that were dominated by others were eliminated.  
Tversky and Kahneman initially tested their theory by altering the wording of 
optional gambles presented during laboratory experiments in order to present same 
problem in terms of gain or loss. In testing the theory beyond its psychology and 
economic roots, framing has since been broadened by other researchers to include 
additional changes in the contextual clues of the decision environment that trigger a 
different approach to evaluating the information at hand (Jones 1994, 81). Geva, 
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Astorino-Courtois, and Mintz (1994, and Astorino-Courtois 2000) used experiments to 
look at two different forms of framing in a foreign policy context. They first shifted the 
reference against which alternatives were evaluated in order to induce frames of gain and 
loss. They then separately tested the effects of cueing different dimensions of a single, 
multidimensional problem. Jones et al. (1998) tested a framing effect that looked for 
different responses based on whether a choice was offered between two options or 
whether an opportunity was offered to adopt or reject a single option.  
Prospect theory also points out that decision making is not a cold science. Jervis 
(2004, 163) argued that this theory taps into the fears and gratifications that are part of 
the subjective well-being arising from everyday human life. He explained that there is 
powerful insight into human nature in prospect theory’s prediction of loss aversion: that 
a given loss based on a perceived point of reference brings more psychological harm to a 
given individual than the same-sized gain produces in gratification. Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) non-linear value function forms the basis for this and related 
phenomena, such as the endowment effect where value increases with possession. 
Several political scientists have used prospect theory as a lens through which 
they have examined historical political decisions (Farnham 1992, McDermott 1992, 
Levy 1992b). However, others have raised questions over whether the conditions 
assumed by this laboratory-based theory translate so easily into the real world of politics. 
In actual decisions, options and their likely risks and payoffs are not found by some to be 
spelled out as clearly as the theory expects (Jervis 1992). Such decisions are often the 
function of a group process, as opposed to the individual decision maker who is the 
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focus of prospect theory (Shafir 1992). Also, vague uncertainties characterize most 
problems in the real world, as opposed to more exact probabilities in theoretical or 
constructed situations (Levy 1992b). Subsequently, Boettcher (1995, 318-9) warned of 
the inherent differences and associated issues with numerical and verbal expressions of 
probability, with numbers conveying greater precision and authority and words being 
affected by the degree to which the outcome is desirable.  
Finally, Frisch discussed three reasons why individuals might treat a problem 
differently for reasons not related to prospect theory (1993, 409). These insights can 
serve as a standard for evaluation of previous and future research claiming to 
demonstrate framing effects. First, a perceptual illusion can cause decision makers to 
treat two problems in different ways, even though they later can recognize the problems 
as equivalent. Second, differences in objective interpretation of detail-rich scenarios can 
lead to dissimilar choices because different details are focused upon. Third, differing 
emotional reactions can also lead to diverging choices. Frisch concludes that differences 
in choice behavior under any of these conditions should not be attributed to prospect 
theory. She also offers a test to see if prospect effects are at the root of a choice 
variation: individuals viewing the same problem presented in different frames will 
remain convinced that they should not be treated in the same manner even when 
presented with the two cases side by side (Frisch 1993, 409).  
Despite challenges such as these, McDermott highlighted multiple advantages to 
the application of this theory in the study of international relations (2004, 290). Chief 
among these benefits was that prospect theory offers a different and valuable perspective 
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providing insight into the microfoundations of a decision process. Additionally, this 
theory uniquely highlights the importance of loss in decision makers’ determinations of 
value and utility, points to the importance of the situational context of a decision, and 
offers a model that focuses on how value changes over time and tradeoffs are made 
between options offering different benefits and costs.  
Given that war can be viewed as the quintessential setting of gains and losses, the 
application of prospect theory to the decisions under consideration in this proposal 
seems highly appropriate. Shaw (2005) called risk the “currency of Western warfare,” 
providing further rationale for consideration of this theory. Indeed, considerations of risk 
take center stage in wartime when targeting occurs under conditions where civilian 
casualties are likely, international law constrains choices, and decision makers operate 
from their own domains of gain or loss. Smith (2008, 144) extends Shaw’s concept of 
currency and points to warfare as an “economy of risk” where political risks and “life 
risks” are assigned values and traded off against each other. Smith’s two categories of 
risk can be expanded and supplemented with others that are inherent in targeting 
operations. These are not all independent types, but are often related due to the nature of 
the security-harm dilemma. Some of these multiple dimensions of risk are as follows: 
 
• National-security risk when a high-value target is bypassed, not attacked, 
and survives to harm a state’s forces or people another day. 
• Force-protection risk of expending the lives of a state’s own military 
forces to attack a target, only to have the target survive, not be present, or 
not be the target expected. 
• Humanitarian risk of harming civilians in the area if the target is 
attacked. 
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• Political risk of domestic and foreign political backlash if a high-profile 
target is not attacked when the opportunity existed. 
• Political risk of domestic and foreign political backlash for approving the 
attack if a larger number of civilians are killed, as well as domestic and 
foreign political risk if a high-value target is allowed to be attacked. 
 
 
 
The consideration of risk is carried forward into the next chapter and represented in the 
targeting decision model described there. However, the ensuing tests of the model will 
only vary humanitarian risk, while holding the other types constant.  
 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has pointed toward the key considerations of a model of wartime 
targeting decisions. Civilian casualties, international standards of how to fight, 
individual decision making, context in the form of prospects for success or failure, and 
risk will all play substantial roles in the theoretical expectations of how these decisions 
are made and what choice results. How such a model is constructed and how it 
incorporates these considerations will be explained next. 
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CHAPTER III 
MODEL, SCOPE, AND METHODS 
 
Some targeting decisions make government officials face a tough choice--a 
dilemma that pulls them between two undesirable options. Choose to attack, and national 
security may well benefit at the expense of civilian lives and livelihoods. Choose not to 
attack, and civilian lives are likely spared, but at the cost of whatever contribution a 
successful attack would have made toward winning the war. This chapter will first 
model the decision that results in this unenviable situation, then model the process by 
which the choice is made. The research questions that flow from the model will then be 
provided. Following this, the portions of the model to be tested and the methods used for 
testing will be briefly overviewed, with more specific hypotheses and design information 
included in later chapters dedicated to individual tests. 
 
MODELING OUTCOME AND PROCESS 
Two separate views of the model are needed to best describe the expected 
content and mechanism of a target planning decision. First, the significant inputs to these 
decisions and the important characteristics of the decision environment will be 
assembled into a structural or outcome view that seeks to predict the choice outcome that 
will result given a certain set of inputs. Second, a process view will be constructed by 
adapting the Cognitive Calculus model of decision making to describe how these various 
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contributions are expected to be integrated into a choice by the decision maker. Both the 
outcome and process views describe different perspectives of a single model. 
Ford et al. (1989), in their review of decision-making research using process-
tracing methods, highlight the difference between structural and process views of the 
model. Structural models focus on the relationship between the inputs to a decision and 
the resulting choice. This type of model is very common in systems-level international 
relations research—both statistical analysis of historical data and game theory are based 
on this approach. However, while structural, or outcome, approaches can be used to infer 
the underlying decision mechanisms, process models specifically seek to look at the 
cognitive steps that lie between the information inputs and the choice outcome. Process 
models seek to answer the questions, “How?” and “Why?” Just because two individuals 
make the same choice does not mean that they arrived at this decision in the same way or 
for the same reasons. 
The targeting decision model operates at an individual level of analysis in order 
to focus on discrete targeting decisions. As described in the previous chapter, this choice 
of level has not been frequently made in IR research, where models have most often 
sought to explain interactions between states. Nor does this targeting decision model 
depend on the typical rational-choice approach that has been the foundation of most 
state-on-state analyses. While the model expects the use of a cost-benefit calculation, it 
also anticipates that the relevancy or weight of the information used will vary in 
accordance with the context of the decision. This section will then conclude with the 
specific research questions for which answers will be sought through tests of this model. 
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An Outcome View of the Targeting Decision Model 
Inputs into airstrike targeting decisions can be broken down into information and 
context components. An initial taxonomy of these considerations is shown in Table 3.1. 
This list is substantial, testimony to the complexity of the decisions it is intended to 
characterize. The information components make possible the determinations of cost, 
benefit, and proportionality that are called for by Just War tradition and international 
law. Benefit information helps determine how much the target is worth and the 
likelihood of successfully destroying it. Is it long-sought enemy leadership or a relatively 
common weapon system? Is it likely to be at its last known location? How heavily 
protected is it? Cost information focuses on the number, gender, and age of the civilians 
at risk, the probability they will be harmed by the attack, and the domestic, war-zone, 
and international political ramifications from previous civilian casualties. As part of the 
decision calculus, the context components bring in other considerations that can affect 
how the cost and benefit information is processed. These include time sensitivity, the 
frame imparted by the prospects for success in the conflict, and the emotions of the 
decision makers. 
In situations where attacking the target is also likely to harm civilians, these 
inputs flow into a decision that can be characterized as a dilemma. As depicted in Figure 
3.1, this choice forces a tradeoff between the two competing preferences of protecting 
national security and avoiding humanitarian harm. Optimally, the decision maker would 
be reasonably expected to desire the realization of both preferences, yet the construct of 
the problem and the available choice options prevents this outcome. This poses a  
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Table 3.1 
Airstrike Targeting Decision Inputs 
I.  INFORMATION - EXPECTED TARGET BENEFIT
A.  Target Value 
1.  Legality/Permissibility: law of war; rules of engagement
2.  Type: leadership/combatants/weapon/communications/etc.
3.  Effectiveness (based on political-military objectives)
B.  Probability of successful strike
1.  Reliability of target identification (intelligence)
2.  Target hardness (ability to withstand attack)
3.  Target presence and persistence  
4.  Constraints on attack (weather, rules of engagement, weapon availability, etc.)
5.  Technical feedback from previous/similar attacks
C.  Indirect, political benefits of previous/future successful attacks
1.  Feedback from domestic sources (public/media/opposition, etc.)
2.  Feedback from international community (governments/populace)
3.  Feedback from "battleground" country (local government/populace)
II.  INFORMATION - EXPECTED CIVILIAN CASUALTY COST
A.  Impact of civilian casualties
1.  Number predicted killed & injured
2.  Number of women & children within total (amplification factor)
3.  Confidence in noncombatant-status (discount factor)
4.  “National partiality” (discount factor)
B.  Probability of collateral casualties
1.  Presence of noncombatants
2.  Geometry and engineering of target area: layout/composition of structures, etc.
3.  Attack parameters: time of day, weapon  & fuzing, etc.
4.  Feedback on accuracy of past estimates
C.  Indirect (social & political) costs of previous/future collateral casualties
1.  Feedback from domestic sources (public/media/opposition, etc.)
2.  Feedback from international community (governments/populace)
3.  Feedback from "battleground" country (local government/populace)
III.  CONTEXT - DECISION ENVIRONMENT
A.  Time sensitivity/urgency
B.  Prospect for success in conflict
C.  Emotions (anger, fear, frustration, etc.)
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different kind of decision-making challenge than the choice between two alternative 
approaches that both seek to maximize a single set of preferences. An example of this 
alternative kind of choice is a decision to either employ diplomacy or to switch tactics 
and use economic sanctions to convince another nation to alter its policy. Such a 
decision would likely be based on whichever approach was expected to best contribute 
to securing the desired policy change. Instead, a targeting dilemma holds two 
incompatible preferences in tension, unable to fully satisfy both, yet requiring that they 
both be considered in the taking of a single decision. 
 
Figure 3.1 
Targeting Decision Structure 
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Furthermore, the potential costs and benefits within the dilemma are expected to 
be weighed differently depending on the context factors present in the decision 
environment. The impact of time constraints on decision-making behavior was the first 
context factor included in the model. The press of time has been highlighted as a factor 
limiting attention and information use. Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001) name it as one of 
their top five agenda items for future decision-making research. Whether in a military 
command center or the upper echelons of the civilian government, time demands are 
expected to be high. The second factor was prospects for success. As used in this 
dissertation, this factor will address the strategic success of winning the conflict, not the 
tactical success of winning a battle. As described in Chapter II, researchers have found 
that frames of loss and gain affect risky choice. This dissertation will test the application 
of prospect theory to the targeting dilemma. The existence of this relationship is 
supported by the review of the literature on conflict and civilian casualties, which 
pointed to states causing more civilian deaths in wartime when those states are in the 
domain of loss.  
The last factor listed was emotion, expected to be prominent in the life-and-death 
considerations of war. Research has shown that negative emotions can impact both the 
choice and how it is formed (Geva and Skorick 2006; Geva, Redd, and Mosher 2004). 
These three factors, time, prospects for success, and emotions are three contextual inputs 
that are appropriate and interesting in the setting of targeting decisions. These three 
factors are also incorporated within the process view of the model that is described next. 
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However, as will be explained, only prospects for success will be tested in this initial 
investigation based on the model. 
While the targeting decision model has assumed that ethical and legal norms 
predominate in the determination of cost, it is also likely that strategic considerations 
play a significant role as well. Strategic concerns would also drive an objective of 
minimizing civilian casualties, but for the sole reason that killing civilians can result in 
the attacking side having to expend more military lives and resources to achieve its 
objectives. One way this can occur is through the generation of enmity toward the 
attacking force. This hatred can lead to additional recruits for the opposing forces, 
strengthen the resolve of the opposing force, and reduction of any assistance that had 
been forthcoming from the populace. The end result can be the necessity of the attackers 
fighting harder and longer, with an associated increase in casualties and expenditures, 
that would otherwise have been the case.  
As far as their role in the model, strategic and humanitarian costs are very similar 
in their effects in the targeting decision model, although they arise from different types 
of concern. Given this, a simplifying assumption in this research is that the costs in the 
model are humanitarian in nature. In the case of the United States, this assumption is 
supported by the extensive training required by the DoD and the individual services for 
all military members regarding the requirements of the law of war and their duty to 
uphold those legal norms (U.S. Department of Defense 2006). Blumenfeld’s interviews 
(2006) offer support for this assumed role of norms in the case of Israel. 
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Process View of the Targeting Decision Model 
The targeting decision process description drew from the Cognitive Calculus 
model to explain the process through which a decision maker determines a targeting 
choice. This selection was made because of the unique features of the model that allow it 
to reflect the effects of cost, benefit, time, emotion, and the framing inherent in prospect 
theory.  
Cognitive Calculus assumes that decision making is an online process, meaning 
that information is continuously incorporated into an internal, ongoing tally that 
continues until it crosses one of the two decision thresholds, stopping the process and 
setting the choice (Geva, Skorick, and Mayhar 2000). This tally is known as the 
cumulative choice propensity (CCP) and reflects both the decision makers’ inclinations 
toward one or the other of the final choice options, as well as the strength of that 
conviction.  
Cognitive Calculus offers an alternative viewpoint to that of expected utility, 
which often assumes that all necessary information is available, used, and 
simultaneously processed in order to calculate costs and maximize benefit. Instead, the 
online assumption of Cognitive Calculus also implies that an individual’s CCP can cross 
a decision threshold at any time, after little, some, or all of the information is taken in by 
the decision maker. The process-tracing features of the model were useful in determining 
the attention that was being assigned to target and civilian casualty information during 
the formation of the decision, as well as in the final choice.  
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Figure 3.2 displays the resulting model with the key Cognitive Calculus features 
clearly indicated. The horizontal axis marks time as information items are sequentially 
processed. The vertical axis tracks positive and negative CCP levels. The attack and do-
not-attack decision thresholds (THAttack and THDo Not Attack) are respectively positioned in 
the positive valence region above the horizontal axis and in the negative valence region 
below the axis. The thresholds may be symmetric or asymmetric around the axis. Two 
factors that can affect threshold positioning are negative emotions and prospects for  
 
 
Figure 3.2 
Targeting Decision Process 
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success, both of which will be explained further at a later point in this section. The CCP 
begins at each decision maker’s own I0,, with the position of this starting point expected 
to be determined by personal bias and other factors. For example, military officers were  
found previously by Semmel and Minix (1979) to be more willing than ROTC cadets 
and civilian students to employ force to resolve foreign policy crises in an experiment, 
so in this targeting scenario the military and defense personnel could be expected as a 
group to have a positive I0. From the starting point, incoming information can then 
incrementally push the tally upwards toward the attack choice or move it downward 
toward the do-not-attack option.  
In Cognitive Calculus, the amount and direction in which items of information 
move the CCP is determined by four factors: valence, relevance, reliability and 
redundancy (Geva, Skorick, and Mayhar 2000). In the process view of the targeting 
decision model, information supporting an attack decision is assigned a positive valence 
and moves the ongoing tally closer to THAttack. Examples of these kinds of inputs might 
be a information about a target’s high value or an estimate of little or no civilian 
casualties. However, information that points to a do-not-attack decision is considered to 
possess a negative valence and shifts the CCP toward THDo Not Attack. Inputs reflecting a 
target’s low value or a high estimate of civilian casualties would be expected to be 
negative-valence information. These and other types of targeting decision inputs are 
listed in Figure 3.3 under their matching valence. The amount of shift in CCP generated 
by a single item of information can be decreased by an amount determined by the 
product of the perceived relevance, reliability, and redundancy of the information, each 
 37
taking values between 0 and 1. In this way, information that is extremely pertinent or 
only somewhat applicable, that engenders high or low confidence in its accuracy, or that 
is unique or duplicative impacts the decision process appropriately. The determination of 
relevance, reliability, and redundancy is a matter of cognitive perception and judgment 
on the part of each individual decision maker.5 
 
 
Figure 3.3 
Valence in Targeting Decision Process 
 
 
 
In the model, the distances between I0 and each of the thresholds represent the 
amount of change in CCP that is required in each direction to cause the associated 
decision to result (Geva, Skorick, Mayhar 2000). For example, if I0 and the attack 
threshold are positioned close to each other, relatively little information with a positive 
                                                 
5 Those these parameters can be established empirically and at times are similar among members of a 
group who share similar values (Discussion with Nehemia Geva, Texas A&M University, September 25, 
2009). 
Positive Valence 
• High-value target
• High P(success)
• Low number of civilians at risk
• Low perceived civilian value/blamelessness
• Positive feedback on previous attacks
Negative Valence 
• Low-value target
• Low P(success)
• High number of civilians at risk
• High perceived civilian value/blamelessness
• Negative feedback on previous attacks
I0
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valence would be required to secure a decision to attack. Once the CCP reaches the 
threshold associated with either attacking or not attacking the target, the individual has 
determined his or her choice and stops the process, including information gathering. 
Additionally, the sequencing of information items matters. A string of items with the 
same valence can cause the CCP to reach a decision threshold much more quickly than if 
the same number of items have mixed valences. Figure 3.2 depicts a short history of 
CCP values that contains two negatively valenced items and three with positive 
valences. While the CCP is a real-time indicator of support, records of sequential CCP 
measurements can also be used in post hoc analysis to recreate a trace that shows the 
history of the choice process. This process tracing capability was used in this 
investigation of the targeting decision process. 
The effects of contextual inputs of time, emotions, and prospects for success can 
also be easily reflected in the Cognitive Calculus model. An unhurried timeline affords 
decision makers the opportunity to access more information, unless their CCPs cross a 
decision threshold and stop the process. Constraints on time can truncate information 
acquisition, forcing final choices to be made before a threshold has been crossed, and 
possibly with different results than if the decision process had been completed. 
Negative emotions have been shown to affect decision threshold positioning and 
other facets of the Cognitive Calculus model (Geva and Skorick 2006; Sirin and Geva 
2006; Geva, Redd, and Mosher 2004). Emotions such as anger have tended to lower a 
decision maker’s threshold for the more aggressive of the two choice options. Decision 
makers have become less concerned about the reliability of information and decisions 
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have come faster. Furthermore, negative emotions have increased the relevancy of 
information with the same valence as the more aggressive decision threshold, further 
hastening the corresponding decision. 
In the targeting decision model, prospect framing is expected to shift threshold 
positioning, but this alone does not determine the choice. The distance of a threshold 
from I0 affects the likelihood of adopting the associated option, given a particular set of 
information. Depending particularly on the valence, the information available can either 
move the CCP toward one threshold or the other. Hence, even a short distance from the 
starting point to a threshold does not make that choice more likely if the valence of the 
information is in the opposite direction. However, given the same set of information, less 
information may be necessary for a decision to result. This will particularly be the case if 
the information is of high relevance. 
When making targeting decisions, both thresholds will be shifted upward 
whenever decision makers perceive they are winning the conflict. Keeping in mind the 
interdependencies just discussed, this will cause THAttack to be positioned farther from I0,, 
marginally decreasing the likelihood of an attack decision. It will also cause  
THDo Not Attack to be closer, increasing the probability the CCP will reach it first, holding 
the information valence and relevancy constant. A winning frame also will increase the 
relevancy or weighting of information with a negative valence, marginally supporting a 
do-not-attack decision. Alternatively, THAttack will be moved closer to I0 and  
THDo Not Attack further away when target planners believe they are losing, placing them in a 
frame of loss and increasing the relevance or weight of positively valenced information. 
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This will induce them, on the margin, to be more likely to accept the risk of civilian 
casualties and press the attack. Thus, depending on the positions of the thresholds, one or 
the other choice options can be favored from the outset because the CCP tally is 
relatively closer to triggering the selection of that option and information favoring that 
alternative will be perceived as more relevant and given more weight. 
In these ways, the targeting decision model is capable of describing how 
targeting decisions are made by individual decision makers based on specific sequences 
of information within a particular set of circumstances. Information is serially processed 
as it arrives by decision makers and incorporated into an online CCP tally depending on 
the characteristics of the information item. Decisions are made when this tally crosses 
the corresponding decision threshold, which stops the process. Because the positions of 
these decision thresholds are adjustable, the model can incorporate the importance of 
loss or gain in this wartime context, as well as other contextual inputs. Thus, the model 
explains choices in very complex, information-rich environments without relying only 
on cost and benefit analyses.  
 
Research Questions and Propositions 
These model views define the key characteristics of the targeting decision 
problem and enable the addition of more detailed questions and propositions that provide 
further focus for this dissertation. In order to gain insights into the more general query 
about how targeting decision are made in the presence of competing preferences, the 
model points to the importance of both information and context, as perceived by the 
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decision maker. In each case, modeled aspects of the decision process raise specific 
questions for this research.  
Looking first at the informational inputs to targeting decisions, it is apparent that 
there are two types of relevant information: target and civilian casualty. Looking at these 
types separately and interaction prompts the following questions and propositions:  
 
• Does support for attacking the target vary with the benefit gained? Given 
the wartime setting and the military members making the choice, the 
decision makers will be able to differentiate the contribution of the target 
toward eventual victory in the conflict. The greater this benefit, the more 
likely that the target will be attacked. 
• Does support for attacking the target vary with the absence of likely 
harm? Because the humanitarian constraints on warfare are well accepted 
in modern democracies, different levels of cost in civilian casualties will 
also be meaningful to decision makers. The greater the harm, the less 
likely that the target will be attacked. 
• Does attention to likely harm vary with the target’s benefit? The dilemma 
between the protection of national security and the avoidance of 
humanitarian harm will not always be resolved in the same way. Given 
the military context of the decision, however, humanitarian harm should 
matter more when the benefit offered by striking the target is meager than 
when it is great.  
 
 
Next, the informational inputs were modeled as being processed serially by the 
decision maker and the number of information items required to reach a decision as 
dependent on the position of I0 and the decision threshold.  
 
• Does the sequence of the inputs matter? Because the two type of 
information have different valences, decision makers should be more 
likely to make the choice that is supported by the information type that 
they choose to view more frequently and earlier in their search.  
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• When do decision makers use more of one type of information than 
another? The model suggests that prospect frame affects information 
relevancy. As a result, decision makers should assign more weight to one 
type of information or the other and choose to view more items of that 
type based on whether they consider their forces to be winning or losing. 
• When do decision makers not view all the information and make an early 
choice? The model expects that when the CCP reaches one of the two 
decision thresholds, the information gathering and choice process stops. 
Therefore, early choices should result whenever a combination of 
information valence and relevancy, as well as threshold positioning, has 
led the decision maker’s CCP to reach the corresponding threshold.  
 
 
 
The model also points to the contextual inputs as able to shape the decision 
outcomes. In this particular investigation, the prospects for success are expected to affect 
the risk attitudes of decision makers and shape their decisions.  
 
• Does a winning or losing frame affect support for the attack? The model 
suggests that the prospect frame will influence decision makers’ risk 
attitudes and increase the relevance of one or the other type of 
information. As a result, decision makers in a winning frame should more 
risk averse and give more weight to harm information and less to target 
information, leading to a marginally higher probability of deciding not to 
attack. This relevancy ordering, risk attitude, and the resulting choice 
should be reversed in a losing frame.   
• Does a winning or losing frame affect support in high stakes dilemmas? 
When facing both high costs and high benefits, the decision maker should 
not be expected to make a choice based solely on a cost-benefit 
comparison. Therefore, the risk attitude, type of information that is more 
relevant, and the decision threshold that is closer should play a large role 
in determining the choice. When in the domain of loss and facing this 
dilemma, decision makers should be more risk acceptant and show more 
support for attacking than when they are in the domain of gain. 
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The pursuit of answers to these questions required methods that look not only at 
the decision outcome, but also illuminated the process that led the decision maker to that 
choice. How this was done is explained in the following section. 
 
SCOPE AND METHODS 
Three individual tests were used to initiate the process of explicating the 
targeting decision model. The first two were experiments, each with unique features to 
enable specific analyses. The last was a statistical analysis of historical data. How each 
was tailored to illuminate specific aspects of the targeting decision process is explained 
below. 
To explore these research questions, this dissertation employed a multi-pronged 
design that used decision-making experiments as its main thrusts. The investigation also 
leveraged statistical analysis of original military attack and civilian casualty data from 
the second Intifada to point to evidence of the targeting decision process at work in 
recent history. This section will briefly introduce both the experimental and observation-
analytical approaches, while leaving more detailed descriptions to the dedicated results 
chapters that follow. 
 
Experiments 
An experimental approach was particularly advantageous for an investigation of 
targeting decisions for two reasons. First, actual military targeting data are closely held 
state secrets and the decisions that result are rarely discussed in the open. Thus, closely 
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studying the historical choices of government officials in the process of targeting was 
not feasible. Second, experiments permit exploration of the micro-foundations of a 
decision process. They do this through the use of controlled manipulations and the 
power of randomization to control for additional influencing factors (McDermott 2002). 
Given the desire to carefully dissect a particular class of difficult decisions, an 
experimental approach was appropriate. It is not uncommon for scholars to expect 
experimentation to offer poor external validity. However, this dissertation sought to 
bolster the generalizability of its results through the use of senior military officers and 
defense civilians as participants (see Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz 2006; Chin, Bond, and 
Geva 2000). These individuals were drawn from the senior-most level of professional 
military education offered by the U.S. Air Force. As students and faculty, they had 
received and given specialized education in the law of war and the DoD targeting 
process. Furthermore, they were all leaders in their respective services and operational 
units and fully accustomed to the military approach to decision making. 
Two experiments were designed. Both incorporated the same aspects of the 
outcome view of the model. Because of the nature of the experimental method and its 
emphasis on control, the experimental tests were limited to the exploration of three 
manipulations of factors drawn from this model. Because of the significance assigned by 
the Just War tradition and international law on target value and the number of civilians 
put at risk, variations in levels of both of these informational inputs were included in the 
research design. The third factor, prospect frame, was selected from the context inputs 
because it offered an interesting opportunity to test the findings of Downes (2007) in a 
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new setting. He implicated several characteristics of war as likely to increase the killing 
of civilians during a conflict. Some of these characteristics fit well within the application 
of prospect theory incorporated in the targeting decision model. For example, wars of 
long duration and high military casualties are also wars that would be likely to be 
perceived from the domain of loss, whereas fighting that resolve relatively quickly and 
with low costs would be expected to place governmental leaders in the domain of gain. 
The decisions that are expected to result based on prospect theory’s emphasis on risk 
acceptance and aversion align well with the results of Downes (2007). 
Both experiments also addressed the model’s process view, but permitted 
different portions of the decision process to be explored by varying the way that 
information was able to be used by the participants. In the first test, the flow of 
information was pre-determined and not permitted to vary. In addition, the all 
information had to be reviewed. In the second test, participants were given greater 
control over the type, sequence, and number of information items they viewed before 
making a decision. The first approach enabled cross-participant comparisons as they all 
received the same informational inputs in a fixed order. The second design enabled 
investigation of issues involving the sequencing and relevance of information, as well as 
the speed of decisions. More information about each design will be provided when the 
associated experiment is discussed in detail in its respective chapter. 
The two experiments were conducted in Fall 2008 with volunteer participants 
drawn from among the mid- and late-career military officers and civilian Department of 
Defense (DoD) employees who were enrolled or teaching in U.S. Air Force military 
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professional education programs.6 Preliminary tests of this experimental approach were 
completed previously using a similar scenario, several of the same variables, and a pen-
and-paper format. These pre-test investigations used college undergraduates, military 
officers, and DoD civilians as participants (Roblyer 2008). The results were supportive 
of employing this methodology as an insightful means of investigating this decision-
making process.  
In this most recent round of experiments, all participants were presented with a 
hypothetical situation in which an airstrike by U.S. military forces was under 
consideration in order to attack a wartime target in a fictitious overseas country. The 
scenario was built to ensure that sufficient information was presented for a decision, but 
not so much input that participants would be overloaded with considerations. Unlike the 
prototype experiments’ pen-and-paper format, the new experiments were executed using 
Infinity Design’s Dec-Tracer web-based platform.7  This enabled detailed control of 
experimental parameters, as well as close monitoring and relatively unobtrusive 
measurement of participant actions. 
Both experiments employed the same 2×2×2 between-groups factorial design, 
manipulating each of three independent variables between two different levels, and 
testing participant responses under each of the eight combinations of those variables. 
Both experiments permitted study of the decision outcomes. The outcome dependent 
variables captured participants’ final choices about support for the proposed airstrike. 
                                                 
6 Thanks go to Air University, a U.S. Air Force education command, for access to Air Command and Staff 
College in-residence students and faculty, and to Air War College in-residence students, distance-learning 
students, and faculty. 
7 With thanks to Uri Geva for developing the platform and making the modifications necessary for these 
experiments. 
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This was done using both a binary choice variable, ATTACK, and a more sensitive, 
scaled measure of support, INTENSITY.  
Process parameters were used to map the process used by the decision makers. 
While unique design features in each of the two experiments enabled differing measures 
of the decision process, a key shared measure, CCP_REPORT, captured participants’ 
CCP as they worked through the scenarios. These measurements were taken by asking 
which direction they were “leaning” and the strength of that conviction at multiple points 
while they read information and proceeded toward their decision. These CCP self-
reports were useful in determining the point effect of the manipulations, as well as in 
reconstructing average CCP traces of participants in each of the experimental conditions. 
Additional process parameters will be described in the chapters dedicated to the 
experiment in which they appeared. 
The independent variables used were TARGET, HARM, and FRAME. The first 
of these, TARGET, established the importance of the target to achieving the war’s 
political and military objectives and was experimentally manipulated between a low and 
a high level. The low-value target was a meeting of low-level enemy operatives against 
which a successful attack would only disrupt enemy activity in the immediate area of the 
country where the war was being fought. The high-value target was a meeting of deputy 
commanders from the enemy forces. Destruction of that target would disrupt enemy 
activity across the entire country. Participants were informed of both the target and the 
expected impact of a successful attack. 
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Independent of the variation in target value received by a participant, additional 
information was also provided about the target, but was held constant across all the 
experimental conditions. This information included the probability of successfully 
hitting the target, the reliability of the intelligence that prompted the call for an airstrike, 
and the legality of attacking the target. While these information items were not varied in 
these experiments, they were included in accordance with the theorized structural model 
of this decision process. Also, all of the additional items provided support for the 
proposed attack. 
HARM, or the number of foreign noncombatants at risk of being killed during 
the attack, was the second independent variable and was set at either 5 or 30 civilians. 
These numbers were grounded in the scenario by using background information 
specifying recent civilian casualties in the war. Similar to the presentation of target 
information, additional inputs about civilian casualties were also provided, but not varied 
between conditions. These inputs, also taken from the structural model for target 
planning, were the probability of harming the civilians, the reliability of the casualty 
estimate, and the legality of the airstrike in light of the target and casualty estimate. 
The final independent variable, FRAME, was manipulated by establishing a 
winning or losing context for the targeting decision. This was accomplished by a 
scenario introduction that provided background on recent events in the war and the 
current assessment of the ability of enemy and friendly forces to garner local support, 
resupply, win battles, and inflict military casualties on the other side. As an example, the 
winning frame in the experiments stated: 
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American forces have clear superiority in firepower and are considered to 
be close to defeating this stubborn insurgency. The logistical supply line 
between the terrorists and the rebels seems to have been broken, with the 
rebels able to mount only weak offensives in the past several months. 
[Local] and U.S. forces continue to consolidate territorial holdings and 
popular support around all of the major regional centers. U.S. military 
casualties have been sharply reduced, with a lower casualty count over 
the past six months than during any similar period since the start of the 
conflict. 
 
 
The eight experimental conditions resulting from the combinations of the above 
three independent variables are shown in Table 3.2. It should be noted that Conditions 1 
and 5 are the strongest presentations of targeting dilemmas. In these conditions, not only 
are the target value and civilian casualty estimate closely matched, but they are both set 
at the high level.  
 
Table 3.2 
Experimental Conditions Created by   
Factors and their Values 
 
 
 Winning Frame Losing Frame 
High Civilian 
Casualties 
Low Civilian 
Casualties 
High Civilian 
Casualties 
Low Civilian 
Casualties 
High-Value 
Target Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 5 Condition 6 
Low-Value 
Target Condition 3 Condition 4 Condition 7 Condition 8 
 
 
Following completion of the experiments, the results were examined using 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) methods. These 
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tools permitted comparison of means between the groups of participants who received 
differing levels of the experimental factors. Additional specifics about these methods 
will be provided in the experimental results chapters. 
 
Analysis of Historical Data 
As a companion to the above experiments, empirical evidence of the theorized 
decision-making model was sought in real-world choices under wartime conditions. An 
opportunity to observe the targeting decision process at work in a democratic 
government other than the United States was also strongly desired. Historical data was 
located that characterized the military attacks, the civilian casualties, and the prospect 
frame that formed the context of the attacks associated with six years of the second 
Intifada, the still-ongoing conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis.  
The Intifada data permitted study of a limited aspect of another instance of 
decision making by a democratic government in conducting military operations against 
adversaries which also risked harming local civilians. It was expected that Israeli 
government officials would regularly wrestle with issues of proportionality under double 
effect conditions and Israeli military attacks against Palestinian terrorists and militants 
would sometimes result in accompanying civilian casualties. Additionally, the nature of 
this conflict with its close proximities and long, torrid history seemed likely to have 
evoked changes in prospect frame for Israeli governmental decision makers as they 
chose whether and how their military forces would respond to terror attacks against 
Israelis.  
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The analysis was performed on an original event data set containing daily records 
of terror attacks, Israeli casualties from those attacks, and Palestinian fatalities from 
Israeli military response during the period from September 23, 2000 to December 20, 
2006. It was expected that the lethality and location of Palestinian terror attacks against 
Israelis would significantly influence the prospect frame from which Israel would 
operate when deciding how their military forces would respond. A preliminary version 
of the data set focused solely on Israeli responses employing airstrikes, but this provided 
too little data to support clear conclusions because airstrikes were relatively rare events 
over the six-year time span. As a result, only hints of relationships between the variables 
could be found (Roblyer 2007). In the new data set, the response event frequency was 
increased by also including Palestinian fatalities from Israeli military ground operations. 
This expansion did not sacrifice any theoretical applicability of the data set as the 
presence of civilians is expected to be anticipated and incorporated into all attack 
planning, whether from the air or on the ground. This investigation and its results will be 
further discussed in Chapter VI. The results not only provide evidence of key aspects of 
the targeting decision model, but they also bolster the argument that the model can apply 
to democratic governments other than the United States. 
 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the outcome and process views of the decision model 
developed to describe targeting decisions in the face of likely harm to foreign civilians. 
The outcome view focused on the external inputs expected to influence what choice 
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would result. Prospect theory was the basis of predicting the outcome given specific 
values of target benefit, civilian casualty cost, and prospect frame. Next, the process 
view drew on Cognitive Calculus to look within the decision maker and explain how this 
information and the winning or losing frame resulted in particular choices.  
This model served as the basis for the design of two experiments to explore the 
decisions of military officers and defense civilians when presented with various 
combinations of the independent variables. Both of the experiments varied the value of 
the target, the number of civilians at risk of harm, and the prospects for success. 
However, the first experiment provided a fixed sequence and amount of information 
while the second permitted participants greater control over information selection and 
decision timing. The specific experimental conditions that included both a high target 
value and high civilian casualty estimate were expected to present a particularly difficult 
dilemma for decision makers to consider. Various measures were developed to capture 
decision outcome and to explore the choice process. Several of these dependent 
variables, as well as more specifics about the distinctions between the two experimental 
designs will be described in the next two chapters. A statistical exploration of historical 
data was also selected to search for evidence of the targeting decision model in action in 
a democratic setting outside of the United States. This test will be further discussed in 
Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT 1: DESIGN, HYPOTHESES, AND RESULTS 
 
As the first experiment opened, participants were presented with a description of 
an ongoing conflict involving U.S. forces, as well as a request for an urgent airstrike 
against the enemy. In the course of the scenario they were given information about the 
prospects for success in the war, as well as the particular target for the strike and an 
estimate of the number of civilians that would die if the attack occurred. By varying only 
the value of the target, the number of civilians, and the future prospects according to the 
eight experimental conditions described in Chapter III, Experiment 1 was able to display 
the dependencies of attack and do-not-attack decisions on these benefit, cost, and 
context variables. It also documented and explored the development of these choices 
during the scenario.  
The results of the experiment show that it was able to contribute toward 
answering several of the research questions raised in the previous chapter. For example, 
participants did vary their support for attacking the target depending on its value. They 
did allow likely harm to civilians to affect their support for an attack. The effects of 
winning or losing on support for the attack and the other factors were more qualified. 
Yet, prospects for success did matter in the tough dilemmas that pitted a high-value 
target against a high estimate of civilian harm. Before describing these and other results 
in greater detail, this chapter will first build on the general description provided in 
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Chapter III and describe the details of the experiment’s design and administration, 
including variables and hypotheses. 
 
DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION 
The following subsections will describe additional specifics about the variables 
used in this particular experiment, hypothesized relationships between the variables, and 
how the experiment was constructed to test these relationships. This section will also 
describe the participants, as well as how the experiments were administered. 
 
Unique Design Features 
Two specific characteristics of this first experiment were unique. First, it required 
that all participants receive the same number and sequence of information items. Second, 
it collected the participants’ self-reported CCPs throughout the scenario while they were 
forming their eventual attack and do-not-attack decisions. Together, these features 
enabled the comparison and analysis of choice formation. The following two paragraphs 
will briefly describe these features and the analysis they permitted. 
Requiring a fixed flow of information meant that all participants received their 
assigned target, civilian casualty estimate, and prospect frame at the same relative points 
in their scenarios. All other information contained in the scenarios was identical in 
content and sequence. This design constraint permitted a clear picture of how individual 
information items affected each participant, without the likely confounding effects of 
variations in order of presentation. However, the fixed-flow requirement also meant that 
 55
this experiment could not be used to explore any questions about participants’ patterns of  
information access—a task left to Experiment 2. 
The evolution of each participant’s eventual choice was also followed as 
participants read each information item and then reported their CCP, or inclination at 
that moment toward attacking the target or not. These data were collected via a measure 
that will be further explained in the next section. The measures were then used to 
construct post-hoc CCP histories that differentiated the decision processes that occurred 
in each of the eight experimental conditions. Further more, the fixed information flow 
also enabled comparison of these CCPs across participants and conditions throughout the 
entire scenario so the effects of each experimental factor on CCP levels could be seen to 
wax, wane, or remain constant as the scenario progressed.  
 
Variables 
As described in the previous chapter, this experiment was developed around 
several dependent and independent variables. ATTACK and INTENSITY were the 
outcome dependent variables, measuring decision outcome as a bi-level yes-no choice or 
a scaled expression of support, respectively. INTENSITY was a composite variable 
constructed by joining ATTACK with the responses to a post-scenario question asking 
participants to mark on a 10-point scale how certain they were about their attack or do-
not-attack choice concerning the proposed airstrike. 
Two process parameters were also used in this experiment to study the decision 
process within the experiment’s fixed flow of information. The first of these variables 
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was CCP_REPORT, which captured participants’ self-reports of the direction and degree 
to which they were leaning at a given moment in the scenario. Each participant logged 
14 CCP entries, beginning immediately after the scenario introduction and repeating the 
assessment after each of the 13 information items.8 Individually, these in-progress 
measures will be referenced as CCP-0 through CCP-13. The other process parameter 
used in this experiment was ITEM_TIME, designed to capture the speed at which 
participants moved from screen to screen while viewing the scenario script. The 
independent variables were limited to the three experimental factors: TARGET, HARM, 
and FRAME. 
 
Hypotheses 
Predictions formed about variable relationships included three main effects—
changes in participants’ behavior in response to manipulation of one independent 
variable. The high-value target was expected, on average, to cause a participant to lean 
more toward an attack decision than the low-value target because the deaths of the 
enemy deputy commanders offered substantially more tactical-strategic benefit than the 
deaths of two enemy soldiers. However, the high value of HARM was expected to cause 
participants to be more likely to choose the do-not-attack option than the low civilian 
casualty estimate because the cost of 30 civilian lives was significantly more than 5 
lives. Finally, participants who believed that their side was losing the war would be more 
                                                 
8 These measurements were a composite score ranging from -100 to +100 (definitely do not attack to 
definitely attack). Participants had been asked to enter whether they were leaning toward attacking or not 
at that moment. They were then directed to enter the strength of their current position on a scale of 1 to 
100 (barely convinced to very definite). These two responses were then combined to form CCP_REPORT. 
 57
likely to support the proposed attack than those who thought they were winning. This 
was because operating from within a frame of loss would make them more willing to 
accept the risk of civilian casualties and more likely to press the attack than those in a 
frame of gain. These three main effects were cast as the following hypotheses: 
 
• H1 (Support Varies with Target Value ) – Participants will show more 
support for attacking the high-value target than the low-value target. 
• H2 (Support Varies with Absence of Harm) – Participants will show less 
support for attacking the target when presented with the high civilian 
casualty estimate than the low estimate. 
• H3 (Support Varies with Prospect Frame) – Participants will show more 
support for attacking the target when they are in the losing frame than in 
the winning frame. 
 
 
Additionally, an interaction of these experimental factors was also expected to be 
statistically significant. The interaction described the cumulative effect of benefit and 
cost in final decision outcomes: 
 
• H4 (Sensitivity to Harm Varies with Target Value ) – Participants with a 
low-value target will be more sensitive to differences in civilian casualty 
estimates than those with a high-value target.  
 
 
This interaction was joined by a hypothesis based on an a-priori contrast that 
described the anticipated behavior when participants were faced with the strongest 
dilemmas among the eight experimental conditions. Conditions 1 and 5, where both the 
target value and civilian casualty estimate were high, will be referred to as the high 
stakes conditions in this report. Under these high stakes conditions, they comparison 
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between cost and benefit was difficult because the relative proportionality was not 
obvious. Therefore, it was the prospect frame that was expected to drive participant 
decisions. In the winning frame, participants were expected to be more averse to the risk 
of civilian casualties. However, in the losing frame, the risk of harm was anticipated to 
hold less sway: 
 
• H5 (Influence of Framing on High Stakes Conditions) – If participants are 
confronted with the high target value and high civilian casualty estimate, 
they will be more likely to support the attack if they are in the losing 
frame rather than the winning frame. 
 
 
 
Research Instrument 
In this first experiment, participants read a scenario that provided the information 
available about the context, target, and civilian casualty estimate in a predetermined 
order, as shown in Figure 4.1. All the participants received all the items of information. 
They self-reported their CCP after reading each of the 14 information items in the 
scenario (see Figure 4.2). At the end of the scenario, all participants then recorded their 
decision as to their level of support for the proposed attack and answered several post-
scenario questions used to collect additional data. The computer automatically tracked 
time per information item.  
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Figure 4.1 
Flow of First Experiment 
(Fixed Information) 
 
 
 
 
Administration 
Over 195 military officers and DoD civilians took part in the experiment as 
anonymous volunteers while attending senior-level professional military education.9 At 
the request of the U.S. Air Force education administrators, the experiment was 
                                                 
9 The officers were majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. Civilians were mid- and upper-grade career 
public servants. The mean time in service of both groups was approximately 15 years. More information 
about their qualifications is available in Chapter III. 
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advertised via e-mail messages to students and faculty. These potential participants were 
invited to take part in the study by selecting the link provided to the Dec-Tracer web 
site. Individuals who agreed to participate were randomly assigned by the computer to 
one of the eight experimental conditions and their scenario began immediately 
thereafter. Participants received no remuneration, nor were there any negative 
consequences for opting out. After removal of several incomplete responses, 187 cases 
remained and constituted the main sample used for analysis, although post-scenario 
questionnaire response analysis was based on a slightly smaller subset of 180 cases. 
 
Figure 4.2 
Placement of CCP_REPORT Measures in Information Flow 
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 61
Participants initially read a set of instructions, then proceeded directly into the 
scenario screens, alternately reading and then entering their in-progress CCP. At the end 
of the scenario they responded with their attack or do-not-attack decision, then answered 
an 11-item post-scenario questionnaire. Most participants completed the experiment in 
approximately 10 minutes. The experiment instructions, scenarios, and questionnaire are 
included as Appendix A. 
 
RESULTS 
This section will first provide evidence of the validity of the experimental 
instrument by briefly presenting the results of manipulation checks built into the post-
scenario questionnaires. Next will follow a summary of the analyses of the participants’ 
final decisions using the two outcome dependent variables. Third, the focus of the 
analysis will shift from decision outcome to process with the reporting of insights drawn 
from participants’ in-progress CCPs. Also, it should be noted that the time 
measurements taken during the decision process will not be reported because they were 
not sufficiently controlled and could not be reliably analyzed.10 This issue will be further 
discussed in the concluding chapter.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 ITEM TIME varied across a very large span ranging from seconds to tens of minutes. Higher values 
occurred frequently enough that attempts to discard outliers or to transform the data were insufficient to 
tame the data. It appears that the cases with large time measurements resulted when participants’ attention 
was temporarily diverted to other tasks, but then later returned to complete the experiment. 
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Manipulation Checks 
Several checks of the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations provided 
evidence that these experimental results and their interpretations were internally valid. 
First, post-scenario questions verified that the participants had read and understood the 
TARGET and HARM manipulations in their scenario. Eighty-eight percent of 
participants correctly recalled the target and 96% accurately reported the civilian 
casualty projection presented in their scenario. However, only 78% of participants 
correctly identified whether the friendly forces were winning or losing in their scenario, 
indicating an issue with how the FRAME manipulation had been received. Participants 
who had been assigned to the losing frame supplied most of the incorrect answers, 
stating that they did not know whether the American forces were winning or losing 
according to the scenario. This pointed to a likely role for the participants’ own 
experience and perceptions in weakening the FRAME manipulation. This issue will be 
discussed further at the end of the decision process analysis section. 
Second, additional questions verified that participants understood the benefit 
represented by the TARGET and the cost inherent in the HARM manipulations to which 
they were exposed. When asked to use a 10-point scale to assess the importance of their 
target toward winning the war, the responses showed that the participants were aware of 
the value of their target. Those with the enemy leadership target, which was designed to 
be highly valued, entered an average rating of 7.78, while those with the low-value target 
of two insurgent operatives recorded a mean value of 5.43 (F(1,179) = 62.08, p < .001). 
Similarly, when participants were asked to use a 10-point scale to characterize the 
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expected cost in civilian casualties when compared to the proposed target in their 
scenario, the participants also were aware of the cost intended by the manipulation they 
had received. Those with the high estimate of 30 civilian lives assigned it a mean cost 
score of 6.84, but those with the low estimate of only 5 civilians assessed its cost to be 
5.22, on average (F(1,179) = 20.46, p < .001).  
While there was no additional question that further explored the FRAME 
manipulation in a direct fashion, prospect frame did influence answers in the target-
importance question in ways that agreed with theoretical expectations. FRAME and 
HARM formed an interaction on the benefit of the target (F(1,179) = 3.67, p <  .05). 
Figure 4.3 shows how the winning frame sensitized participants to the differences in 
civilian casualties. According to prospect theory, those in the domain of gain would be 
risk averse, seeking to conserve what they currently held. This would lead them to pay 
more attention to the costs associated with different decision options in order to avoid 
high risk. This result was statistically significant, although the greatest perceived 
difference in target importance was only 1 point on a 10-point scale. 
Yet, FRAME’s influence in the question about civilian casualty cost was the 
opposite of that predicted by prospect theory. The interaction of FRAME and TARGET 
is shown in Figure 4.4, where the average participant scores in the losing frame show 
greater attention being given to the differences in cost than in the winning frame. This 
inconsistency in the operation of FRAME provided another reason, in addition to the 
lower recall score associated with that manipulation, to closely monitor the role of 
prospect frame in this experiment. 
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Figure 4.3 
Influence of FRAME and HARM 
on Target Importance 
 
 
Figure 4.4 
Influence of FRAME and TARGET on Target Importance 
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The final internal validity check verified successful randomization of the 
participants to the different experimental conditions. An ANOVA of CCP-0 by FRAME, 
TARGET, and HARM confirmed that none of these experimental factors had any 
significant influence on the scores reported at CCP-0. This was the experiment’s first 
measure, occurring before any of the three manipulations had been introduced into the 
scenario. The result established that random assignment of participants to conditions had 
been successful and the average starting points within each condition were effectively 
the same for the purposes of the analysis. 
These checks confirmed that the TARGET and HARM experimental 
manipulations were effective. Although the FRAME manipulation was weaker than the 
other two, it was still able to interact with TARGET to influence both the perceived 
benefit and cost of the proposed airstrike according to the scenario experienced. 
However, the latter interaction was not in the direction expected. The rationale for this 
apparent anomaly is developed later in this chapter. Finally, these checks also 
established that successful randomization occurred. Together, these results laid the 
groundwork for the analyses that will follow and encouraged special attention when 
interpreting the effects of FRAME. 
 
Decision Outcome Results 
As described earlier, the decision outcomes were measured in two different ways, 
with ATTACK recording a simple yes or no response to participants’ support for the 
proposed airstrike, and INTENSITY adding to that measure the level of participant 
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certainty for each response. The analyses of these variables with respect to each 
experimental factor are grouped below according to the outcome-related research 
question to which they contributed an answer. The results also appear in Table 4.1.11 
 
Table 4.1 
Effects of Experimental Factors  
on Targeting Decision Outputs (ANOVA of Experiment 1) 
 
 
 
 
  Results for ATTACK #   Results for INTENSITY ## 
Factor 
(Levels) Means F p 
 Means F p 
FRAME   
(Losing / Winning) --- 1.086 .150 
 
--- 1.336 .125 
TARGET * 
(Low / High Value) .563 / .704 4.055 .023 
 
.98 / 3.48 4.926 .014 
HARM ** 
(Low / High Nbr) .724 / .544 6.677 .006 
 3.96 / 0.49 9.486 .001 
TARGET x HARM --- .548 .460  --- .151 .698 
 *  p < .05      ** p < .01 
  #  Where ATTACK is dichotomous with 0 = Do Not Attack and 1 = Attack 
##  Where INTENSITY is scaled from -100 (Definitely Do Not Attack)  to +100 (Definitely Attack) 
 
 
 
Does Support for Attacking the Target Vary with the Benefit Gained? 
Results from analyzing the bi-level ATTACK and scaled INTENSITY dependent 
variables provided favorable evidence for H1: support for the attack was more likely with 
the high-value target than with the low-value alternative. An ANOVA of ATTACK by 
all three factors resulted in a significant main effect of TARGET (F(1,179) = 4.06, p < 
.05), with the high-value target resulting in 70% of the group supporting the airstrike, 
                                                 
11 Logistic regression results for ATTACK appear in Appendix B as an alternative presentation to the 
ANOVA table. 
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while only 54% of the participants receiving the low-value target chose to support the 
attack.. An ANOVA of INTENSITY by all three factors similarly showed TARGET to 
have a main effect (F(1,179) = 4.93, p < .05). On average, the high-value target elicited 
moderate support for the attack from participants, with participants expressing, on 
average, 3.48 points of support for that target, but a weaker response of only .98 support 
points for the low-value target.12 These results all answered the research question in the 
same way: targets matter in targeting decisions and the more benefit to be gained from a 
target, the more support. 
 
Does Support for Attacking the Target Vary with an Absence of Likely Harm? 
H2 also received support from analysis of ATTACK and INTENSITY. With both 
measures, participants showed less support for attacking the target when presented with 
a high estimate of harm than when given a low civilian casualty estimate. An ANOVA 
of ATTACK by all three factors showed a main effect of HARM (F(1,179) = 6.68, p < 
.01). Only 54% of participants with high casualty projections supported the proposed 
airstrike, as opposed to 72% of those presented with the lower estimate of civilian 
casualties. This outcome was reinforced by an ANOVA of CERTAINY by all three 
factors. The result was another main effect of HARM: participants who received the low 
estimate of civilian harm reported an average of 3.96 points of support on a 10-point 
scale, while those in the high-harm condition averaged only 0.49 points (F(1,179) = 
                                                 
12 Scale was -10 to +10. 
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9.49, p < .005). Civilian casualties clearly matter and higher levels of harm estimates 
will result in lower amounts of support for attacking the target under consideration. 
 
Does Attention to Likely Harm Vary with the Target’s Benefit? 
No support was available for H4 from ANOVA analyses of ATTACK and 
INTENSITY. It had been expected that participants with a high-value target would pay 
less attention to the cost of civilian casualties than those with the low-value target. In 
both analyses, the interaction of TARGET and HARM was not statistically significant. 
 
Does a Winning or Losing Frame Affect Support for the Attack? 
H3 had predicted that participants would show more support for attacking when 
they were in a frame of loss than when in a frame of gain. However, the exploration of 
ATTACK and INTENSITY found no distinguishable effect of FRAME on support for 
the proposed strike.  
 
Does a Winning or Losing Frame Affect Support in High Stakes Dilemmas? 
While prospect frame had no general effect, it was a significant influence in the 
two experimental conditions that presented high stakes to the participants. As H5 
expected, when participants were presented with the opportunity to target two enemy 
senior leaders, but only at the likely cost of 30 civilian lives, 75% of the participants 
placed in the domain of loss chose to support the attack. However, as predicted by 
prospect theory and the targeting decision model, the level of support dropped 
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significantly among individuals facing the same dilemma between security and harm 
when, instead, they were in the domain of gain. Only 54% of the participants who have 
been told that their forces were winning supported the proposed airstrike under the same 
target and casualty conditions (F(2,53) = 27.91, p < .001). These results were obtained 
using a reduced data set that included only those participants who were assigned to 
Conditions 1 or 5, the only conditions where both target value and the civilian casualty 
estimate were high. An ANCOVA of ATTACK by FRAME with CCP-0 as a covariate 
was then performed on this revised data.13 The inclusion of the covariate was necessary 
to incorporate into the analysis the dissimilar values of I0 that existed in the two 
conditions.  
When INTENSITY was used to check for this same high-stakes effect of 
FRAME, the effect was found to be similar, but only on the cusp of statistical 
significance (F(2,53) = 5.89, p = .053).14 The mean score in the negative frame was 4.02, 
while among those in the positive frame the average score was 0.02, offering further 
confirmation of the influence of framing on decisions under these specific conditions. 
 
Decision Process Analyses 
Analyses of the CCP_REPORT variable were supportive of the process predicted 
by the targeting decision model and provided insight into the evolution of the choices 
captured at the end of the scenario by the ATTACK and INTENSITY measures. The 14 
                                                 
13 CCP-0 was also significant (F(1.53) = 4.31, p < .05). Model was evaluated while holding CCP-0 = 
43.71. 
14 CCP-0 was also significant (F(1.53) = 6.35, p < .01). Model was evaluated while holding CCP-0 = 
43.71. 
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measures of CCP-0 through CCP-13 documented the participant positions with regard to 
the proposed air strike after each information item. Selected points were analyzed in two 
ways. First, the average CCP_REPORT values that were measured immediately before 
and after the introduction of each of the three experimental manipulations were plotted. 
These points were then compared to the theoretical expectation at that stage of the 
experiment. This approach took advantage of the process tracing aspect of these in-
progress CCP measures to visually display the changes in the participants’ evolving 
choice as first prospect frame, then target value, and finally the civilian casualty estimate 
were introduced. Overall, the expected and actual CCP patterns were very similar.  
Second, these same values of CCP-REPORT were made the subject of between-
group and repeated-measure ANOVAs using the factors that had been introduced up to 
the corresponding point in the scenario. These analyses give both a qualitative and 
quantitative picture of how the decision process develops, marking and dissecting the 
changes in CCP level, as well as progress toward the final decision. The results will 
show that prospect frame, though absent in the results from the analysis of ATTACK 
and INTENSITY, was an active influence during portions of the decision process. In 
addition, the target value, and civilian casualty manipulations both worked as 
theoretically expected in the choice process. Finally, a special case that led to a result 
that was opposite to that predicted by prospect theory and the targeting decision model 
will be discussed. 
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Plotting CCP Traces 
Based on the process view of the decision model described in Chapter III, 
expected traces of CCP_REPORT were built from the following theoretical expectations 
for CCP movement due to the introduction of the three experimental manipulations. 
Supporting information about the target was provided in Information Items 3-7 and 
about the estimate of civilian harm in Information Items 8-13, but were not plotted. 
These items were drawn from targeting decision model’s outcome view and were the 
same for every participant. The additional information included inputs such as the high 
probability of successfully hitting the target, the high reliability of the casualty estimate, 
and an affirmation of the legality of the airstrike in light of both the target and casualty 
estimate. As expected, most of the CCP movement occurred during the introduction of 
the three manipulations and not during the additional information. The expected CCP 
movement was as follows: 
 
• Information Item 0 to 1 (FRAME) 
o Losing Frame: CCP up sharply (risk-seeking in domain of loss) 
o Winning Frame: CCP down moderately (risk-averting in domain of 
gain) 
• Information Item 1 to 2 (TARGET) 
o Low-Value Target: CCP down moderately (doubtful of target 
importance) 
o High-Value Target: CCP up sharply (certain of target importance) 
• Information Item 7 to 8 (HARM) 
o Low Civilian Casualty Estimate: CCP down moderately (moderate 
desire to avoid harming a few civilians) 
o High Civilian Casualty Estimate: CCP down sharply (strong desire to 
avoid harming a large number of civilians) 
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These theoretical CCP traces were paired with the mean values of 
CCP_REPORT for each of the eight conditions in Figure 4.5.15 The results were good 
qualitative matches in six conditions, with the expected and actual traces matching in 
direction for every factor, although the CCP-REPORT was sometimes more extreme in 
its movement than expected. The remaining two conditions contained the winning frame 
and the low-value target. There, the expected and actual traces matched direction in 
response to both the frame and civilian casualty manipulations, but CCP-RECORD 
moved opposite to the prediction in response to the low-value target input. The rationale 
for this apparent anomaly is offered later in this section. 
 
Information Item 0: Starting Point 
The average participant started at the moderately supportive choice propensity of 
38.63 on a scale of -100 to 100. Given that the participants were military members, this 
initial bias toward support was not unexpected (see Semmel and Minix 1979). As 
explained in Chapter III, cognitive calculus labels this starting point I0. The broad range 
(-100 to +100) of the initial values of I0 served to raise the bar for a successful test of the 
process view of the targeting decision model using this data.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 In the figure, all plots begin at the same relative point, so can be compared across conditions. However, 
the horizontal axis in each plot is for reference only and does not denote the boundary between positive 
and negative valence (i.e., an attack or do-not-attack decision). 
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Figure 4.5 
Actual and Expected CCP Movement Due to Manipulations 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Item 1: Introduction of FRAME 
Whereas FRAME had no main effect on either of the two decision outcome 
measures, a clear influence was apparent in the CCP self-reports at the point where the 
frame manipulation was introduced. Participants who had been assigned to the losing 
condition responded, on average, with a support rating of 63.50, according to an 
ANOVA of CCP-1 by FRAME (F(2,185) = 68.40, p <  .001). Those in the winning 
condition recorded a much lower average score of 27.07. The CCP movement that 
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resulted is shown in Figure 4.6. As expected, the participants in the domain of gain were 
risk averse and less supportive of the attack in the face of likely civilian casualties. Also, 
the participants in the domain of loss were risk prone and more supportive of the 
airstrike. 
 
Figure 4.6 
Effects of FRAME on CCP  
Across Information Items 0 & 1 
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The introduction of different levels of TARGET had a substantial effect on 
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target condition reported a support score of 41.05 on average, while the mean score 
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main effect from the previous information item was no longer significant in these 
between-group ANOVA results. An ANOVA of CCP-1 and CCP-2 (before and after the 
introduction of TARGET) as a repeated measure with FRAME as a factor revealed why 
this was so. 
The repeated-measure analysis pointed to an interaction between the repeated 
measure and FRAME (F(1,183)=7.85, p < .01). As shown in the first panel of Figure 4.7, 
the introduction of the TARGET manipulation at Information Item 2 resulted in no 
significant change in the average CCP score given by participants in the losing frame. 
The average participant in this group, already acting as a risk seeker and strongly 
supportive of the airstrike, did not find reason in the new target information to change 
that position. However, those in the winning frame were quick to abandon their initial 
position of relative risk aversion when presented with the target information. These 
participants significantly raised their CCP scores, independent of the value of the target 
in their scenario. Because the mean CCPs of the two frame groupings ended up 
relatively close together, FRAME lost its influence as a main effect. This converging 
tendency stood in stark contrast to the divergence apparent in the effect of the variation 
in target value on mean CCP scores, as shown in the second panel of Figure 4.7. That 
panel visually depicts the power of the different targets to drive participant support, with 
the high-value target securing a mean support score that was more than 30 points higher 
than the average response of participants with the low-value target. 
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Figure 4.7 
Effects of FRAME and TARGET on CCP  
Across Information Items 1 & 2 
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.001). This result was in the direction expected, with those in the high-estimate 
conditions being more reluctant to support the airstrike. In fact, the average CCPs 
reported in each of the eight conditions all dropped to near or below the mean starting 
point of 38.63 recorded at Information Item 0. While the model predicted this drop, the 
magnitude of the changes in mean CCP was approximated four to six times larger than 
any decrease caused by either FRAME or TARGET. In addition, the high civilian 
casualty estimate resulted in the first negative mean CCP score, indicating disapproval of 
the proposed attack.  
 
Figure 4.8 
Effect of HARM on CCP 
Across Information Items 7 & 8 
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conditions reporting an average CCP score of 34.87 and the low-value conditions 
recording a much lower -8.35 (F(1,179)=18.06, p < .001). Despite the fact that the 
participants were newly aware that approving the airstrike would mean that civilians 
would likely die, the participants with the high-value target were still quite willing to 
press on with the attack. However, those with the low-value target often found the cost 
too great for the level of benefit available, as indicated by the negative valence of their 
average score.  
Additionally, as predicted in H3 and shown in Figure 4.9, target value moderated 
the effect of the civilian casualty estimate as it was introduced (F(1,179)=3.27, p < .05). 
This interaction of the two factors caused the participants with the low-value target to be 
much more sensitive to the cost of civilian casualties than were those who had received 
the high-value target. In the low-value target conditions, there was approximately a 20-
point drop in mean CCP scores when moving from the group in the low harm group to 
the group facing the high estimate of harm. However, this sensitivity was magnified 
among participants who received the low-value target description. In the high-harm, 
low-value condition, the average support was over 50 points below the average in the 
low-harm, low-value situation—while also switching the valence of the average CCP 
score from positive to negative. This phenomenon was consistent with a distinctly 
stronger aversion to risking larger numbers of civilian lives for a target that offered little 
expected contribution toward defeating the adversary.  
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Figure 4.9 
Influence of Interaction of TARGET  
and HARM on CCP 
 
 
 
While FRAME exhibited no main effect at this point in the scenario, it was not 
without influence. A significant interaction occurred between the repeated measure built 
with CCP7 and CCP8 and all three of the experimental factors (F(1,179)=4.22, p < .05), 
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variations of HARM were introduced. This interaction has been broken down into the 
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prospect frame and target value. The top two panels both correspond to winning frame 
conditions and show a pattern of movement that is very similar to the overall pattern 
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Figure 4.10 
Effect of FRAME, TARGET, and HARM on CCP 
Across Information Items 7 & 8 
 
 
When comparing the two left panels in Figure 4.10, one can see the sensitizing 
effect of the winning frame on cost in the presence of a high-value target. Furthermore, 
when comparing the bottom two panels, the effect of shifting the target value from high 
For Winning Frame & High-Value Target
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Info Item 7 
(Last Target Info))
Info Item 8
(Civilian Casualty
Estimate)
M
ea
n 
C
C
P-
R
ep
or
t
High Harm (Cond 1) Low  Harm (Cond 2)
For Winning Frame & Low-Value Target
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Info Item 7 
(Last Target Info))
Info Item 8
(Civilian Casualty
Estimate)
M
ea
n 
C
C
P-
R
ep
or
t
High Harm (Cond 3) Low  Harm (Cond 4)
For Not-Winning Frame & High-Value Target
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Info Item 7 
(Last Target Info))
Info Item 8
(Civilian Casualty
Estimate)
M
ea
n 
C
C
P-
R
ep
or
t
High Harm (Cond 5) Low  Harm (Cond 6)
Not-Winning Frame & Low-Value Target
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Info Item 7 
(Last Target Info))
Info Item 8
(Civilian Casualty
Estimate)
M
ea
n 
C
C
P-
R
ep
or
t
High Harm (Cond 7) Low  Harm (Cond 8)
 81
to low while maintaining the losing frame also becomes clear. While the participant 
support responses in the lower left panel did not show differentiation between the two 
levels of humanitarian harm, the lower right panel shows the most distinguishing 
responses among the four panels. In this losing, low-value-target condition, participants 
expressed, on average, a 101-point drop in support for the proposed attack when it was 
accompanied by the likelihood of harming 30 civilians. This response would be 
consistent with participants who had become strongly persuaded that the attack should 
not proceed against a “fool’s bet” target that contributed little to the fight, yet was likely 
to exact a great humanitarian cost. This cost was evidently amplified by the losing frame 
and the low-value target, both factors that had induced risk aversion and drops in 
CCP_REPORT on their own.. The rationale behind this additive effect may have been 
that participants incorporated additional political and social costs due to the local and 
international backlash that would be reasonably expected if the cost of the attack was 
seen as severely disproportional to the benefit gained. This backlash would be all the 
more costly when the friendly forces were already losing the conflict and badly needed 
the good will of the local populace and of their allied nations. For the remainder of this 
dissertation, the condition corresponding to the losing frame , low-value target, and high 
estimate of harm (Condition 7) will be referred to as the Fool’s Bet condition. 
Finally, when looking at the right two panels in Figure 4.10, it is clear that it is 
no longer the winning frame that is sensitizing participants to cost. As just recently 
described, in the left two panels it was the winning frame that made participants more 
sensitive to civilian casualties when juxtaposed against a high-value target. This result 
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was consistent with prospect theory. However, in the two right panels, both of which are 
associated with the low-value target, it was the losing frame that made participants react 
most distinctly to the differences in estimates of likely harm. This result is a variance 
from prospect theory’s expectation for how framing works, yet it makes sense in the 
context of the Fool’s Bet. In Condition 7, the standalone abilities of the losing frame and 
the low-value target to induce risk aversion were combined to further amplify the 
already high cost of the civilian casualties.  
 
Summary of In-Process Effects 
The above analyses of the in-progress measures of participant support revealed a 
rich landscape of causal relationships with the three experimental factors, both alone and 
in combination with each other. This provided four points of useful feedback for the 
model, with each point corresponding to one of the first four hypotheses. 
First, the benefit of a given target (H1) exerted a strong influence in the model 
which was capable of both increasing and decreasing support. The target with higher 
perceived benefit generated uniformly strong support for attacking. However, the low-
value target, under certain conditions, caused participant support to drop. These 
influences of variations in TARGET lasted through the remainder of the scenario.  
Second, humanitarian cost (H2) also mattered in the determination of participant 
support for the airstrike, leading to some dramatic decreases in CCP scores and causing a 
significant number of participants to switch from supporting to not supporting the attack 
at that point in the scenario. The estimate of civilian casualties prompted a very strong 
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response from participants upon its introduction, rapidly decreasing support for low 
estimates of harm, but caused support to plummet when casualty expectations were high. 
In this latter case, the CCP-8 mean carried a negative valence, indicating that the group 
of participants in the high-harm conditions were ready to reject the attack. These effects 
of HARM continued until the end of the scenario.  
Third, this effect of the civilian casualty estimate was made more nuanced by the 
target value given to the participant (H4). When the target value was high, differences in 
the size of the civilian casualty estimate mattered relatively little compared to when the 
target value was low. When participants knew that the air strike would only gain the 
benefit of killing two insurgent operatives, they gave the humanitarian harm information 
more weight in their decision process and their CCP responses were accordingly more 
distinct. 
Fourth, the analyses prompted additional insights into how framing (H3) operates 
in these targeting decisions. Except for when FRAME was first introduced, it exerted no 
main effects, but did significantly influence how other factors affected CCP_REPORT. 
However, these effects came and went as prospect framing showed itself to be a very 
conditional source of influence. At the outset of the experiment, losing improved support 
for an attack and winning lowered support. This outcome agreed with the model. 
However, this straightforward result occurred only when no specific information about 
target benefit or civilian casualty cost was available to the participants. In particular, the 
effect of the winning frame was weak and the clear differentiation between prospect 
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frames in the results disappeared as soon as specific target benefit information was 
introduced in the next information item.  
Yet, framing modified the effect of benefit and cost later in the scenario. This 
modification took two different forms, depending on the value of the target. When 
attacking the target was expected to bring a high payoff, it was frame that determined 
whether participants were risk accepting or averse, with the losing frame leading to 
acceptance and the winning frame resulting in aversion, as theoretically expected. 
However, when the target offered little benefit, an inversion occurred, leading the 
participants in the losing frame to become even more risk averse than individuals in the 
winning frame. This was the opposite of what prospect theory would have predicted. 
Individuals who are in the domain of loss are supposed to take risky chances in order to 
improve how their position. Translated into the targeting model, this meant that the 
participants who were losing (but wanted to win) were expected to be more willing to 
attack the target, despite the risk of harm to civilians. However, participants with the 
low-value target and high civilian casualty estimate were faced with overwhelming cost 
for very little, if any, gain—what was labeled earlier as a Fool’s Bet—and their CCP 
scores dropped significantly. This result offered a modification to the model that will be 
tested in Experiment 2. 
Furthermore, it can now be seen that the unexpected direction of the interaction 
of FRAME and TARGET in the manipulation check that explored participants’ 
perceptions of cost was a component of the Fool’s Bet phenomenon. Figure 4.4 had 
previously shown how the combination of a losing frame and a low-value target had 
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raised participant sensitivity to the cost of casualties. This was not a problem with the 
FRAME manipulation, but one piece of what has since been labeled the Fool’s Bet 
condition. Similarly, the actual CCP traces from the two conditions with winning frame 
and low-value targets (Conditions 7 and 8) differed from theoretical expectations 
because of this same phenomenon. While the low-value target had been expected to 
moderately elevate the participants’ CCPs, in the presence of the losing frame it led to a 
drop in CCP instead. Both of these results were thought to be aberrations at the time, but 
were actually different partial views of the Fool’s Bet condition. 
However, the influence of prospect frame was also often weak. Whether this was 
inherent in the factor itself or due to an insufficiently powerful manipulation in the 
experiment is not known for certain. However, as described earlier, the post-scenario 
questions did point to the participants’ recall of the frame manipulation being the poorest 
of the three experimental factors. A review of the results from asking participants how 
American forces were faring according to the scenario showed that over 70% of the 
incorrect answers were from participants in the losing frame. Furthermore, all of their 
answers except for one were “Unknown” or “Stalemate.”  
The sometime problematic performance of FRAME may have been attributable 
to its placement in the scenario. As the first manipulation of the three experimental 
factors, and followed by 12 additional items of information prior to each participant’s 
final decision, its influence may have been overwhelmed by other considerations. This 
explanation is strongly supported by the fact that participants responded so clearly and in 
the anticipated manner when FRAME was introduced at Information item 1, yet the 
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main effect of framing was immediately eclipsed in the next item’s TARGET 
manipulation. These two experiments may offer unique insights into the experimental 
exploration of multiple aspects of choice behavior in a context varied through the use of 
framing.  
In a brief survey of other political science experiments that have investigated the 
effects of prospect frames, these investigations have routinely tested only hypotheses 
directly related to framing. They also have consisted of a single scenario input requiring 
only several lines of text, followed immediately by the presentation of decision options 
or a series of questions (Boettcher and Cobb 2006; Boettcher 2004; Quattrone and 
Tversky 1988). The targeting decision scenario differed from this pattern, not only in its 
simultaneous investigation of the roles of benefit, cost, and framing, but in the amount 
and variety of information provided to the participants. Because of the fixed flow of 
information received by the participants, they were presented with significantly more 
and more varied information than appears to have been the norm in related experimental 
investigations. Although targeting decision makers during an actual conflict would be 
dealing with even larger amounts of more complex information, they would also be 
immersed in the current prospects for their side’s success and unable to easily let it slip 
out of focus. Improvements in the strength of presentation of framing inputs in 
experimental scenarios would be required to more closely mimic the power of real-world 
framing.  
Another explanation may have also contributed. Participants’ perceptions of what 
constitutes “winning” and “losing” may have confounded the FRAME manipulation in a 
 87
limited, but substantive number of cases. Given the seniority of the participants, they 
may have overlaid their own experience or pragmatism on the scenario and been 
unwilling to accept the provided progress assessment (i.e., the framing) as ground truth. 
This may have led these participants to respond from a position other than the domain of 
loss intended by the experimental condition. This issue could have resulted from 
contravening participant experience, bias, or other internal factor.  
While the results of this test of framing are mixed, it is also important to 
recognize that the concept of framing is itself somewhat ambiguous. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981, 453) defined decision frame to mean “the decision-maker’s 
conception of the acts, outcomes and contingencies associated with a particular choice” 
and tied it to deviations from a reference point. This leaves much leeway in defining a 
frame and how it works. It also explains in part why neither psychologists nor political 
scientists have yet developed a theory of framing (Boettcher 2004). Outcome framing, 
the type used in this experiment looks at changes with respect to a reference point that is 
anchored on the status quo. However, framing effects can also be based on perceived 
differences from a goal, or what Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) called an “aspiration 
level.” The actual source of framing in operation may also vary from person to person. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 453) expected the perception of frame to be 
individualistic, depending on “the norms, habits and personal characteristics of the 
decision maker.” While framing effects induced through experimental manipulations, 
such as was done here, are considered to be somewhat reliable (see Boettcher 2004), 
additional research is required to better understand the framing phenomenon.  
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In this experiment, it was apparent from the results that prospect frame exerted 
influence in multiple ways, but never as clearly as expected. The effects of FRAME will 
be discussed further in the next chapter. Also, the concluding chapter will explore how 
the presentation of FRAME can be improved in future investigations so as to minimize 
these likely detractors. 
 
SUMMARY 
This chapter described the construct and the results of the first of two 
experiments. Intentionally constrained to present all the available information in a fixed 
order to all of the participants, this experiment afforded the opportunity to study both 
their final decisions, as well as how the information affected the formation of those 
choices as each new piece of information was introduced. All three experimental factors 
played roles in outcome and process. Individual CCPs were tracked throughout the 
scenario and the historical plots of their traces provided multiple interesting insights into 
how choice develops and changes en route to targeting decisions. Additionally, high 
stake and Fool’s Bet conditions were identified as unique and important within the 
targeting decision model. In these special cases, in particular, prospect frame mattered. 
The following chapter will focus on the second experiment, which lifted some of 
the constraints on information flow and decision timing in order to enable the 
investigation of different aspects of the decision process. The effects of TARGET, 
HARM, and FRAME on decision outcomes were expected to remain the same in this 
second experiment. However, the more fluid design would prevent most comparisons of 
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CCP_REPORT as had been done in this first experiment. Instead, new process measures 
would be used to gather data on information use patterns and decision timing. This 
permitted analysis of the remaining research questions focused on the relevance of 
certain types of information and shifts in decision thresholds. In addition, the ability for 
participants to make early decisions was expected to enable exploration of a more 
natural information flow that ends as soon as a decision is made and the decision maker 
stops listening. The first experiment forced participants to read all the information, even 
if their own CCP had reached a decision threshold prior to the last information item 
when they could record their choice. How this might affect final decisions is not yet 
understood. 
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT 2: DESIGN, HYPOTHESES, AND RESULTS 
 
The second experiment was included in this dissertation to build on what was 
learned in Experiment 1 by enabling the exploration of additional decision process 
parameters. While the first experiment had provided insight into what targeting decision 
was made under various conditions, it was more limited in what it could say about how 
and why those outcomes resulted. This was because the experimental design pushed 
information to the participants, giving them no opportunity to indicate either what 
information was meaningful to them or when they had heard enough. Hence,  
Experiment 2 was specifically designed to explore more of the decision process and to 
develop answers to the following research questions: Does the sequence of the inputs 
matter? When do decision makers use more of one type of information than another? 
When do decision makers view less than all the information and make an early choice? 
These questions are important because they relate directly to the process aspects of the 
model and its expectations that choices happen whenever an individual’s CCP reaches 
the corresponding decision threshold. Therefore, participants’ preferences for the type 
(valence) of information, the order in which it is accessed, and the position of the 
participants’ decision thresholds hold the keys to understanding better what decision will 
result and how quickly it will be made.  
In order to study these additional aspects of the targeting decision process, 
alterations were made in the first experiment’s design to permit variation in the flow of 
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information and in decision timing. Also, five new processing parameters were added to 
capture variations in how participants accessed information and moved through the 
scenario. The results of the experiment both corroborated the decision outcome results 
from Experiment 1 and offered conditional answers to queries into how these decision 
outcomes were generated. 
This chapter will proceed to describe the design, expectations, and results of 
Experiment 2 in much the same manner as the previous chapter did for the first 
experiment. Where variables or other aspects of the second experiment are unchanged, 
they will be only briefly described here, since additional details were provided in the 
previous chapter.  
 
DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION 
This section will provide an overview of the unique features of this experiment’s 
design, the variables explored in this experiment, and the expectations that were 
developed concerning relationships between those variables. It will also explain how 
tests of these hypotheses were incorporated into the experiment’s design. Finally, the 
section will describe the participants and experiment administration. 
 
Unique Design Features 
While this experiment used the same scenario as the first, participants were 
afforded more control over what information they viewed and when they could make 
their final decision. Experiment 1 had used a fixed flow of information, requiring that all 
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participants review all 13 information items and then enter their choice about supporting 
or rejecting the proposed airstrike. However, in Experiment 2, participants could view as 
few as 7 information items or as many as all 13 before entering their decision. They 
could also move freely between the target and civilian casualty information categories, 
based on whichever was more salient to them at that time, as they sought input before 
making their choice.  
Figure 5.1 depicts the revised experimental design and the differences in how 
participants could move through the scenario. Beginning with Information Item 2, 
participants were free to view the first item in either category and remain in the category 
until the six items were exhausted, or they could move back and forth between the 
categories at will.16 This design feature allowed participants to focus mainly on 
information about the target or on the estimate of civilian casualties, as they desired.  
However, complete freedom for participants in information access selection and 
decision timing was not provided. This constraint was put in place in order to preserve 
the experiment’s ability to generate results based on all three experimental factors. All 
participants were required, at a minimum, to view the first information item from both 
categories since this item was where the TARGET and HARM experimental treatments 
were located. Only then would participants know both the description of their assigned 
target and the associated estimate of likely harm. This prerequisite determined the 
minimum amount of information required prior to an early decision. Because 
participants could view all six of the information items from one category before 
                                                 
16 The ordering of information within each category was predetermined. Participants could only select a 
type of information. They would then be provided the next item in that category’s queue. 
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viewing the first item from the second category, the scenario was programmed to only 
permit early decisions after the seventh and subsequent information items. 
 
Figure 5.1 
Flow of Second Experiment (Variable Information) 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Several variables were carried forward from the first experiment: the factors 
TARGET, HARM, and FRAME; the outcome dependent variables ATTACK and 
Prospect Frame 
(Winning / Losing)
Target Information
1. Description 
(High / Low Value)
2. Benefit of Attack
3. P(Hit)
4. Rel(Hit Prediction)
5. Law of War - Facts
6. Military Legal Opinion
Civilian Casualty
Information
Attack Support Decision (Yes / No)
** Only accessible after 7 pieces of info viewed**
Post-Scenario Questionnaire
EXPERIMENT 2
(Factors: Prospect Frame, Target Value,
and Civilian Casualties)
Key
Optional Move  
Required Move
CCP Self-Report
Scenario Introduction
1. Number (High / Low)
2. P(Harm)
3. Other Attack Options
4. Rel(Hit Prediction)
5. Law of War - Facts
6. Military Legal Opinion
M
ust be accessed in this order
M
ust be accessed in this order
Info
Item #
0
1
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INTENSITY; and the process parameter CCP_REPORT. However, CCP_REPORT 
could be used for comparison across conditions and participants only at CCP-0 and 
CCP-1 (the measurements corresponding to Information Items 0 and 1).17 
Because this part of the project was intended to focus on the patterns of 
information access and decision timing, five new process measures were also included. 
The total number of information items viewed, TOTAL_ITEMS, was used to gauge the 
size of participants’ need for information before making a final decision.18 
TOTAL_ITEMS was a count variable ranging from 7 to 12 because it started tracking 
the number of information items accessed when participants were first able to make a 
final decision. FIRST_ITEM captured the category from which participants selected 
their first piece of optional information.  
The way that participants then moved between the target and civilian casualty 
information categories was also expected to be pertinent. This aspect was characterized 
by DIVERT_ITEM, a measure of when participants switched from their initial 
information category to the next. DIVERT_ITEM was a discrete variable that ranged 
from 2 to 7, reflecting the reality that participants’ first opportunity to switch was upon 
selecting their second optional information item and their last opportunity would be 
following their sixth item, if they had elected to exhaust one category’s information first. 
TARGET_ITEMS and HARM_ITEMS tracked the number of information items viewed 
                                                 
17 After Information Item 1, there was no fixed order of information access across all participants. This 
prevented the comparison of CCPs across all participants and conditions, as had been done in Experiment 
1 with a fixed sequence of information. 
18 Initially, the number of items viewed from each of the target and civilian casualty estimates were also 
tracked, but are not reported here. For the conditions of interest in the related hypothesis, these individual 
category counts provided no additional information beyond that available in the results of the analysis of 
TOTAL_ITEMS. 
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in each of the individual categories. Finally, how participants used time during the 
choice process remained an interest item from Experiment 1. Time was incorporated into 
Experiment 2 through the use of TOTAL_TIME as a measure of time from Information 
Item 1 to the final decision. 
 
Hypotheses 
All five of the hypotheses from the first experiment were tested again. They are 
repeated here for ease of reference: 
 
• H1 (Support Varies with Target Value) – Participants will show more 
support for attacking the high-value target than the low-value target. 
• H2 (Support Varies with Absence of Harm) – Participants will show less 
support for attacking the target when presented with the high civilian 
casualty estimate than the low estimate. 
• H3 (Support Varies with Prospect Frame) – Participants will show more 
support for attacking the target when they are in the losing frame than in 
the winning frame. 
• H4 (Sensitivity to Harm Varies with Target Value) – Participants with a 
low-value target will be more sensitive to differences in civilian casualty 
estimates than those with a high-value target. 
• H5 (Influence of Framing on High Stakes Conditions) – If participants are 
confronted with the high target value and high civilian casualty estimate, 
they will be more likely to support the attack if they are in the losing 
frame rather than the winning frame. 
 
 
A sixth hypothesis was added to test the resiliency of the Fool’s Bet phenomenon 
found in the first experiment, which operated as explained below: 
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• H6 (Framing’s Influence on Fool’s Bet Conditions) – When placed in a 
situation with a low-value target, but a high estimate of civilian 
casualties, participants in the losing frame will show less support than 
those in the winning frame. 
 
 
Additional hypotheses were constructed for the new process measures enabled by 
the new experimental design. Once participants were given control over information 
selection, FIRST_ITEM was the initial indicator of which category of information was 
most relevant to them. A second indicator of relevancy was DIVERT_ITEM, or how 
long they continued to view items from that initial category. Participants in the losing 
frame were expected to more frequently choose the target category and continue viewing 
information from that category longer than those in the winning frame. This would be 
the case because participants in the domain of loss would be more accepting of risk and 
benefit-related information would be more relevant than the costs entailed in the civilian 
casualty information. 
 
• H7 (First Type of Information Accessed) – Participants in the losing 
frame will be more likely to view target information first and longer than 
those who are in the winning frame. 
 
 
 
A third contribution to an understanding of relevancy was the individual counts 
of total information items accessed in each of the two categories. TARGET_ITEMS was 
expected to be higher than HARM_ITEMS when participants were in the losing frame 
and benefit-related information was particularly relevant. On the other hand, this 
relationship would be reversed, with HARM_ITEMS posting the higher count of the two 
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categories when participants were in the winning frame. This would make them risk 
averse and raise the relevancy of information associated with potential costs. 
 
• H8 (Information Use by Category) – Participants will view more target-
related information items when participants are in losing frame than in the 
winning frame. They will view more harm-related items when they are in 
the winning frame than in the losing frame.  
 
 
Participants were assumed to use information as a whole to assess and process 
risk, so total information use was expected to be related to risk attitude. Harm-related 
information would answer questions such as “How bad will this get?” Target-related 
items might be accessed to answer queries similar to “Is this cost really worth it?” 
Therefore, information need was anticipated to climb when risk was high and 
participants were risk averse. Being in the domain of loss, they would act conservatively 
and exercise extra care in their decision process. On the other hand, requirements for 
information would dip, despite the high level of risk, whenever individuals were risk 
accepting. Positioned in the domain of loss, these participants would be ready to gamble 
and so would be less intentional in their choice formation. Since risk was anticipated to 
be greatest in the high-stakes conditions, the hypothesis below is focused on responses 
when both TARGET and HARM were at the high level.  
 
• H9 (Total Information Use Under High Stakes Conditions) – When target 
value and estimate of harm are both high, participants in the winning 
frame will access more information items overall than those in the losing 
frame. 
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Additionally, the targeting decision model predicted that the total amount of time 
from the start to the finish will be determined by the position of the associated threshold, 
given a particular set of information. Thus, a faster attack decision will result whenever 
a participant’s THAttack is shifted lower by the losing frame and his or her CCP can reach 
this threshold sooner. The opposite will occur in the winning frame, when THAttack has 
been moved farther away and the decision therefore will be more delayed. Since this 
effect of framing is dependent on the valence and relevancy of the information viewed, 
this hypothesis will be tested using the high-stakes conditions. While all participants in 
these conditions did not view the exact same information, they will have all seen the 
same values of TARGET and HARM, the inputs expected to have the most impact. 
Furthermore, the high-stakes conditions posed a difficult dilemma that could be expected 
to take some time to resolve. Therefore, these conditions offered a difficult test for the 
operation of framing on decision timing. 
 
• H10 (Speed of Decision Under High-Stakes Conditions) – Participants in 
the losing frame will make a quicker decision than those in the winning 
frame. 
 
 
 
Research Instrument 
As explained and shown earlier in this chapter (see Figure 5.1), Experiment 2 
contained all the same information and manipulations of TARGET, HARM, and 
FRAME. In addition, through the scenario introduction and the first information item, it 
 99
ran exactly as did Experiment 1. However, beginning with Information Item 2, 
participants were asked to use a menu to select and view information about the target or 
the civilian casualty estimate. After each item, they were returned to the menu for the 
next selection. There were six items of information that were accessible through each of 
the two menu buttons. The sequence of these six items within each category was fixed.  
As before, all participants provided self-reports of their CCP after reading each 
new piece of information. They also recorded their final decision to either support or not 
support the proposed airstrike, although that final choice could be made as early as after 
reading Information Item 8 or as late as following Item 13. The minimum number of 
eight items was necessary to ensure that all participants received all three experimental 
treatments. After making a final decision, all participants completed the same post-
scenario questionnaire that was used previously. Also, the computer tracked all 
participant selections and elapsed time. 
 
Administration 
One hundred eighty professional military education students agreed to participate 
in the experiment as anonymous volunteers. Recruitment and access to the experiment 
was unchanged from the approach used for Experiment 1. The sample was reduced by 
one case during the analysis of the time variable in order to remove an extreme outlier.19 
 
 
                                                 
19A box and whisker plot identified one extreme outlier that was more than three-times the size of the next 
closest time entry. 
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RESULTS 
Despite the participants having greater control over the flow of information and 
the timing of their final decision, the tests of the five hypotheses repeated from the 
previous experiment had very similar results to those from Experiment 1. This 
confirmation of findings under revised conditions increased the robustness of these 
results. Additionally, the altered design features led to new insights about the decision 
process, including factors affecting information selection and speed of decision.  
These and other results will be described and discussed below. However, first the 
manipulation checks will be highlighted and an issue with random assignment of 
participants to conditions will discussed and the remedial actions explained. Following 
these, the discussion will first focus on the decision outcome analysis and then highlight 
the decision process results. 
 
Manipulation Checks 
Specific questions answered by each participant following the scenario provided 
confirmation that the participants understood and responded to the experimental 
manipulations. Accuracy was at least as high as in the first experiment, with 92% of 
participants correctly recalling the target value, 96% the number of estimated civilian 
casualties, and 84% the frame from their assigned scenario. 
Additional questions explored how participants perceived benefit and cost. In 
both cases, experimental factors were found to be influential in the answers provided. An 
ANOVA by all three factors of the benefit expected from striking the target showed a 
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main effect of TARGET (F(1.163) = 151.19, p < .001). Participants rated the high-value 
target as an 8.23 on a 10-point scale while awarding an average of only 4.64 points to the 
low-value target. When asked to rate the cost of the estimated casualties with respect to 
the target in their scenario, a similar ANOVA of cost pointed to main effects of HARM 
(F(1,163) = 20.23, p < .001) and TARGET (F(1,163) = 29.01, p < .001).20 A high 
estimate of harm led to a mean cost score of 7.09 and the low estimate resulted in only 
5.46 points. Showing that cost was relative to benefit, low-value targets led to the higher 
cost score of 7.26 compared to the high-value target score of 5.30.21 
These results engendered confidence that the experimental instrument functioned 
much as it was intended. The results were a positive contribution toward the internal 
validity of the experiment that is analyzed in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
Random Assignment Issue 
A problem with the random assignment of participants to the eight experimental 
conditions was identified early in the analysis of CCP_REPORT. A significant portion 
of the explanatory power of the experimental method is rooted in the use of 
randomization because the control of variations in the test environment is essential. 
However, participants routinely bring with them a myriad of different experiences, 
characteristics, and other internal variations which are beyond the investigator’s ability 
to reliably regulate. When random selection of participants is not possible, as was the 
                                                 
20 The main effect of TARGET on a cost-related dependent variable suggests an interdependency between 
benefit and cost. 
21 There was no additional question that specifically checked the framing effect. Nor did frame create a 
main or interactive effect in the questions about benefit or cost. 
 102
case in these experiments, the inevitable differences between participants are routinely 
handled by randomizing their assignment to the experimental conditions (McDermott 
2002). In the first experiment, this assumption was verified by an analysis of CCP-0, the 
starting point of the decision process. The results showed CCP-0 to be unaffected by any 
of the three planned manipulations: FRAME, TARGET, and HARM. This indicated that 
the assignment of participants to conditions had been sufficiently random in  
Experiment 1.  
However, a similar check of the results from Experiment 2 flagged an 
unexpected issue. The ANOVA of CCP-0 indicated a significant interaction of TARGET 
and HARM (F(1,161) = 7.75, p < .005), manipulations that had not yet been introduced 
into the experiment. Further analysis showed this result was an artifact caused by 
markedly lower CCP means in two of the conditions (averaging 4.82) than in the 
remaining six (averaging 36.09).22 According to the targeting decision model, where a 
participant’s CCP stops is dependent, in part, on where it began. Hence, CCP-0 was 
pertinent in the analyses of ATTACK and INTENSITY. While the randomization issue 
could certainly taint the analysis results, incorporation of the starting point into the 
calculations through one of various methods served to account for these problematic 
differences between the groups’ starting points. Whenever a measure in the following 
sections was theoretically expected to be affected by a participant’s starting CCP, the 
associated analyses took this into account by including CCP-0 as a covariate or as part of 
                                                 
22 The two conditions with low means were Conditions 3 (Winning / Low Target / Low Harm) and 7 
(Losing / Low Target / Low Harm). 
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a repeated measure. For example, this approach was used in the analysis of both of the 
outcome variables.  
 
Decision Outcomes 
Of the three experimental factors, TARGET and HARM were the two that again 
played significant roles in shaping participants’ final decisions. Just as in the first 
experiment, these decisions were measured in two ways: using the attack or do-not-
attack perspective of the bi-level ATTACK variable, as well as the finer measurement of 
support for the attack as captured by the scaled INTENSITY variable. The analyses of 
both measures will be discussed in this section, beginning with ATTACK and using the 
applicable research questions as a framework. The results also are included in Table 
5.1.23 
 
Does Support for Attacking the Target Vary with the Benefit Gained? 
Both ATTACK and INTENSITY reflected stronger support for the airstrike 
when the target was the two enemy leaders rather than the two insurgent operatives (H1). 
TARGET exerted substantial influence on the valence of the final decision, as captured 
by an ANCOVA of the ATTACK variable by all three experimental factors and using 
CCP-0 as a covariate (F(1,160) = 31.91, p < .001).24 The effect was in the direction 
                                                 
23 Logistic regression results for ATTACK appear in Appendix B as an alternative presentation to the 
ANOVA table. 
24 In this and the other ANCOVAs in this chapter, CCP-0 was also significant and means of the factors 
were evaluated while holding CCP-0 at its mean of 28.44. The covariate was included because a 
participant’s CCP must travel a greater or smaller distance to cross the decision threshold depending on 
where the CCP starts. CCP-0 is the measure of I0 in this experiment. Since there was a significantly large 
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predicted by theory, with the high-value target eliciting support 84% of the time, but 
with only 48% of the participants receiving the low-value target supporting the proposed 
airstrike. The main effect of TARGET on INTENSITY was also distinct, as measured by 
the same ANCOVA approach (F(1,160) = 35.71, p < .001). The low-value target 
prompted an average support score of -.60, indicating a slight majority were in favor of 
rejecting the attack, but the high-value target drew much stronger support with a mean 
score of 5.69.25 
 
Table 5.1 
Effects of Experimental Factors  
on Targeting Decision Outputs (ANCOVA of Experiment 2) 
 
 
 
 
  Results for ATTACK #   Results for INTENSITY ## 
Factor 
(Levels) Means F p 
 Means F p 
CCP-0 *** --- 15.553 .000 
 
--- 17.480 .000 
FRAME   
(Losing / Winning) --- .048 .414 
 
--- .020 .444 
TARGET *** 
(Low / High Value) .476 / .835 31.908 .000 
 
-.559 / 5.691 35.712 .000 
HARM ** 
(Low / High Estimate) .738 / .572 6.776 .005 
 4.094 / 1.038 8.468 .002 
TARGET x HARM --- 1.116 .146  --- 1.308 .128 
 * p < .05      ** p < .01      *** p < .005 
  #  Where ATTACK is dichotomous with 0 = Do Not Attack and 1 = Attack 
##  Where INTENSITY is scaled from -100 (Definitely Do Not Attack)  to +100 (Definitely Attack) 
Factor effects evaluated with CCP-0 set to its mean (28.44) 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
range of CCP-0 averages among the groups of participants assigned to different experimental conditions, 
inclusion of the covariate accounted for the variation in starting point. 
25 Scale was -10 to +10. 
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Does Support for Attacking the Target Vary with the Absence of Likely Harm? 
The main effect of HARM (H2) was also significant whether measured against 
ATTACK or INTENSITY. An ANCOVA of ATTACK by TARGET, HARM, and 
FRAME with CCP-0 as a covariate revealed a main effect in the anticipated direction 
(F(1,160) = 6.78, p < .01). In the low-estimate conditions, 74% of participants indicated 
their support for the airstrike, while only 57% of those receiving the high estimate 
supported the attack. Similarly, the effect was also as hypothesized when INTENSITY 
was analyzed via an ANCOVA using the same approach (F(1,160) = 8.47, p < .005). 
The low harm estimate received a support score of 4.09, while the high estimate’s mean 
score was only 1.04.  
 
Does Attention to Likely Harm Vary with the Target’s Benefit? 
As was the case in Experiment 1, analyses of both ATTACK and INTENSITY 
found no significant interaction of TARGET and HARM. This offered no support for H4 
and the expectation that the high target value would lead to less attention to the casualty 
estimate than the low target value. 
 
Does a Winning or Losing Frame Affect Support for the Attack? 
FRAME was unable to significantly influence decision outcome, whether 
analyzed with respect to ATTACK or INTENSITY. H4’s expectation of an effect on risk 
attitudes, and thus willingness or reticence to attack, went unsupported. 
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Does Winning or Losing Affect Support in High-Stakes Dilemmas? 
While FRAME did not generate a main effect across all the experimental 
conditions, it exerted influence on one of the two outcome dependent variables in the 
subset consisting of the two high stakes conditions (H5). Caught between the opportunity 
to attack a very beneficial target and the likelihood of killing a large number of civilians 
in the process, participants in the losing frame were only slightly more ready to press the 
attack than those who were in the winning frame. Using the reduced data set consisting 
of only the cases in Conditions 1 and 5, an ANCOVA of INTENSITY by all three 
factors showed that individuals in the losing frame expressed 5.25 points of support, 
whereas those in the winning frame recorded a mean support score of 5.04 (F(2,38) = 
3.89, p < .05). A similar analysis of ATTACK did not find a significant influence of 
FRAME. 
 
Does a Winning or Losing Frame Affect Support Under Fool’s Bet Conditions? 
This research question was added as result of the empirical results of  
Experiment 1 that pointed to a reversal of the expected risk attitudes whenever target 
value was low, yet estimated harm was high—the Fool’s Bet conditions. H6 described 
the expected behavior under this mismatched combination of TARGET and HARM: in 
the losing frame, participants would be more risk averse and less willing to support the 
attack than if they had been in the winning frame. Experiment 2 supported this 
hypothesis. Looking only at the cases in which target value was low, yet estimated harm 
was high (Conditions 3 and 7), an ANOVA of ATTACK by FRAME showed a 
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significant main effect (F(2,39) = 9.63, p < .001).26 The effect was in the hypothesized 
direction, with 38% of the participants in the winning frame declaring their support for 
the proposed airstrike, but only 25% of those in the losing frame willing to do so. This 
was further confirmed by an ANOVA of INTENSITY that showed winning-frame 
participants posting a mean support score of   -2.19, while the losing frame led the other 
group to average an even lower score of -4.80.27 Under high stakes conditions, the 
participants in the losing frame would have been more supportive of the airstrike than 
those in the winning frame. However, a change of target value from high to low and the 
Fool’s Bet conditions exerted control, reversing the order of the framing effect and 
making those in the losing frame the source of weaker support. 
 
Summary of Decision Outcome Results 
Altogether, these results reinforced the clear role of benefit, in the form of target 
value, and cost, in the form of humanitarian harm, in the outcomes of these decisions 
about airstrikes. FRAME was not influential in a general way across all conditions, but 
did post a sizeable effect under the Fool’s Bet conditions and a partial effect under the 
two high stakes conditions. Absent again was the anticipated interactive effect of 
TARGET and HARM on outcome. The following section will discuss how the three 
experimental factors were found to influence the decision process. All the factors will 
again play a role in the process of choice formation, although sometimes in different 
ways than seen in Experiment 1. 
                                                 
26 An ANCOVA using CCP-0 as a covariate was also run, but the covariate was statistically insignificant. 
27 CCP-0 was not significant in either analysis, so it was excluded in the final analyses. 
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Decision Process 
This experiment differed in design from the first because it permitted participants 
to have greater control over the information they viewed and the timing of their decision. 
Beginning with Information Item 2, participants were permitted to choose freely 
between viewing target information and civilian casualty information items. They could 
also choose to open all 12 of the items, but no fewer than seven items.28 Several 
parameters were measured to characterize the varying patterns of information 
acquisition. These design features permitted the investigation of additional facets of the 
decision process, including information item selection patterns and speed of decisions. 
However, flexibility in participants’ access of information prevented almost all post-hoc 
move-by-move comparisons of participant support, as had been done in the analysis of 
the first experiment. CCP scores could be compared only at Information Item 0 (the 
scenario introduction) and Information Item 1 (the FRAME manipulation).29  
The results of the decision process analyses will be discussed in this section, with 
all three experimental factors exerting significant influence in the evolution of choice. 
After the effect of FRAME at CCP-1 is presented, the remainder of this section will be 
structured using the process-oriented research questions introduced in Chapter III. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 This lower limit was required, given the experiment’s design and coding, to ensure all participants 
received both the target and the civilian casualty manipulation. 
29 The results of the analysis of CCP-0 responses were used to identify the issue with random assignment 
as previously discussed. No further analysis regarding CCP-0 will be discussed here. 
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Information Item 1 and Prospect Frame 
Information Item 1 introduced the FRAME variations to the participants. Just as 
in Experiment 1, the CCP-1 score distributions were shaped by the framing 
manipulation. This main effect was confirmed by an ANCOVA of CCP-1 by FRAME 
with CCP-0 as a covariate (F(1,166) = 9.10, p < .001)30, as well as by a repeated-
measure ANOVA of CCP-0 and CCP-1 by FRAME (F(1,167) = 7.21, p < .005). Figure 
5.2 shows how this main effect repeated the pattern found in Experiment 1, where the 
losing frame drove up the average support level and the winning frame caused a slight 
drop in support. Because of the first experiment’s results, it was not surprising that 
FRAME had such a distinct effect in isolation from other manipulations, yet not exert 
any significant influence in the decision outcome. Despite the apparent weakness of the 
prospect frame’s effect in influencing the final choice, FRAME did appear again as a 
significant influence in additional facets of the decision process. 
 
Does the Sequence of Inputs Matter? 
While participants in the losing frame were expected to be more likely to start off 
with target information than those in the winning frame (H7), over 90% of the 
participants across all conditions chose to access target-related information first. 
Therefore, no conclusions could be drawn about the effect of FRAME on initial 
information selection. This result could be an artifact of screen design because target 
information was the top-most of the two options. Order effects are well known in 
                                                 
30 CCP-0 was also significant (F(1,166) = 235.397, p < .001) and was held at its mean of 28.44 during the 
evaluation of frame. 
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experimental methodology and can only be ruled out when the sequence of options is 
varied as an experimental manipulation. 
 
Figure 5.2 
Effect of FRAME on CCP  
Across Information Items 0 & 1 
 
 
However, after the selection of the first item, FRAME did have the anticipated 
influence on how long participants continued to view target-related information before 
switching to the civilian casualty estimate category. Using a reduced data set of only 
those participants who had started with target information (154 cases), an ANOVA of 
DIVERT_ITEM by FRAME and TARGET revealed a main effect of prospect framing 
(F(1,150) = 3.75, p < .05). Among this subset of participants, those in the losing frame 
chose to view 1.7 additional items, on average, where those in the winning frame only 
saw 1.3 more items before choosing to look at their first piece of harm-related 
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information. This result supported the expectation that participants in the losing frame, 
where gain was most meaningful, would initially seek out more benefit-related target 
information than would those in the cost-focused winning frame.  
 
When Do Decision Makers Use More of One Type of Information Than Another? 
When looking at all the information viewed by each participant, the total number 
of items used in each category varied in a more complex way than anticipated. H8 had 
predicted a main effect of FRAME. However, an ANOVA of TARGET_ITEMS by all 
three experimental factors showed an interactive influence of FRAME in concert with 
TARGET and HARM (F(1,161) = 4.76, p < .05). An ANOVA of HARM_ITEMS by all 
three experimental factors pointed to a similar three-way interaction (F(1,161) = 4.32, p 
< .05). Figure 5.3 shows the complexity of both of these sets of results.  
 
Figure 5.3 
Effects of FRAME, TARGET, and HARM  
on Number of Information Items Used by Category 
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Focusing on the high-stakes conditions offered one way to extract meaningful 
information contained within the results. These conditions, as marked in Figure 5.3, 
were distinctive in both analyses. When participants were in the losing frame and had 
been given both a high-value target and a high estimate of harm, they used the least 
amount of target and harm information of any group on average. Furthermore, the 
participants in the high-stakes winning frame used the most harm information and were 
among the four conditions that tied as the biggest users of target information. 
Using only the cases in the high-stakes conditions, further analysis was then done 
to determine if frame operated as hypothesized under these particular circumstances. 
Both the ANOVA of TARGET_ITEMS by FRAME (F(2,39) = 333.31, p < .001) and the 
ANOVA of HARM_ITEMS by FRAME (F(2,39) = 374.03, p < .001) resulted in a main 
effect of FRAME. Participants in the domain of loss used, on average, 4.23 items of 
target information and 3.57 items of harm-related information. This was compared to 
participants in the domain of gain, who accessed 4.95 pieces of target information and 
4.90 items of harm information on average.  
Whereas H8 had been based on an expected difference in relevancy as 
determined by framing and information type across all eight conditions, it is within the 
high stakes conditions that this effect is seen. There, participants in the losing frame used 
less of both target-related and harm-related information than those in the winning frame. 
Yet, the results from the high-stakes conditions also point to a bias between the types of 
information within the losing frame. Those participants used more target information 
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than harm-related items, while participants in the winning frame used approximately the 
same amount of items from both categories. 
 
When Do Decision Makers View Less than All the Information and Make an Early 
Choice? 
To assist in answering this research question, H9 proposed a test focused on the 
high-stakes conditions and based on the assumption that information would be used to 
assess and process risk. Framing would then influence risk attitudes, which in turn would 
drive total information use: frames of loss creating less of a need for information and 
winning frames causing participants to desire more information. The high-stakes context 
was used to ensure the presence of a high degree of risk. In this experiment, a 
participant’s final choice could occur as early as following the seventh item of 
information or as late as after the thirteenth. The experiment produced results that 
supported H9. Using only the cases from the high-stakes conditions (Conditions 1 and 5), 
an ANOVA of TOTAL_ITEMS by FRAME revealed a main effect of FRAME in the 
expected direction (F(2,39) = 434.94, p < .001). Participants in the losing frame used an 
average of 7.86 items of information, just above the minimum number of seven items, 
while participants in the winning frame used 9.85 items. The results of this test follow 
directly from those in the preceding paragraph, where the type of information had been 
expected to matter, but did not in the high-stakes conditions. Instead, it was FRAME that 
exerted a clear influence on overall information use. 
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According to the targeting decision model, these results indicate that participants 
facing both a high-value target and high estimate of harm, on average, had CCPs that 
were reaching a decision threshold earlier when they were in the domain of loss than in 
the domain of gain. Also according to the model, this speed of decision was due to some 
combination of threshold position, the amount of information, and the valence and 
relevancy of that information.  
Corroboration of this result was available by looking at the TOTAL_TIME 
variable. This measurement captured the elapsed time from Information Item 1 until the 
final decision by each participant and so offered another way to assess speed of decision. 
TOTAL_TIME, however, was not a direct measure of the amount of information, but 
incorporated time spent processing each item accessed. Using the same high-stakes 
subset of conditions, an ANOVA of TOTAL_TIME by all three experimental factors 
revealed the expected influence of FRAME (F(2,39) = 196.30, p < .001). Participants 
facing both a high-value target and a high civilian casualty estimate were noticeably 
quicker to make a decision when they were in the domain of loss (mean of 214.8 
seconds) than in the domain of gain (mean of 246.9 seconds). 
 
Summary of Decision Process Results 
Knowing the frames in which participants had been placed was the key to 
successfully predicting how they would work through the decision process in order to 
arrive at their choice. The targeting decision model expected that a frame of loss would 
result in risk-acceptant decision makers who would be more focused on target 
 115
information, less interested in information as a whole, and faster to reach a decision. All 
of these expectations found support, although sometimes qualified by the necessary 
presence of high risk in the form of a dilemma pitting a high-value target against a high 
estimate of civilian casualties. Yet it was in these high-stakes conditions that the results 
could be the most surprising if one expected decision makers faced with difficult 
dilemmas in contexts of high risk to deliberate long and hard over their choice. Instead, 
Experiment 2 has shown that framing and risk attitude have substantial influence over 
information use and time, even in those difficult circumstances. This result becomes 
more remarkable when compared against the mean number of items used by each of the 
other six conditions. This reveals that the two high-stakes conditions used the least items 
of information of all the conditions.  
 
SUMMARY 
The results of the second experiment were very similar and complementary to 
those of the Experiment 1 and so increased confidence in the targeting decision model. 
Target values and estimates of civilian casualties were again substantiated as the key 
influences on decision outcome. However, framing again influenced the decision process 
and came to the fore under the particular circumstances of high-stakes and Fool’s Bet 
conditions.  
Experiment 2 was specifically designed to permit participants greater flexibility 
in accessing information and in determining when they were ready to make their 
decisions. This enabled the investigation of additional decision process parameters, the 
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results of which increased the level of understanding about the formation of choice. The 
results clearly centered on the role of framing involving prospects for success or failure 
in the conflict, as well as the associated risk attitudes and considerations of information 
relevancy imparted by those frames. While almost all of the participants began their 
search for input with target-related information, prospect framing was a major influence 
in how long they continued to view target information. When placed in the stressful 
dilemmas of the high-stakes conditions, framing was a major determinant of how much 
information participants used prior to their decision. Additionally, framing helped 
determine how quickly participants moved to make a choice.  
The following chapter will take the concepts of cost, benefit, and attitude toward 
risk out of the laboratory and seek evidence of their influence in a historical event 
involving decision makers from a different democratic setting. This next analysis 
sacrifices precise control over conditions and participants to gather evidence that the 
hypothesized and experimentally documented relationships operate also in the real 
world. 
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CHAPTER VI 
HISTORICAL DATA ANALYSIS:  
DESIGN, HYPOTHESES, AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents a different approach to testing aspects of the targeting 
decision model. Following the two experiments, this analysis is intended to seek 
evidence that the model helps to explain behavior outside of the laboratory and within 
real international conflict. However, one of the primary reasons the targeting decision 
model was initially tested using experimental methods was the unavailability of detailed 
historical data documenting the inputs to, and outcomes from, actual targeting decision 
processes. This constraint led to the search for observational data that could be used to 
test the model from outside the process. Direct knowledge of exact targets, their 
perceived value, or a-priori estimates of civilian casualties would be extremely limited, 
if available at all.  
The source of these data was found in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict known as 
the second Intifada. In this conflict, as in others, the weapons of war could be used in 
ways that either maximized the likelihood of destroying the target or sacrificed some of 
that certainty in order to minimize harm to nearby civilians. A unique aspect of the 
second Intifada was the data available on both the terror attacks by Palestinians against 
Israelis and the Israeli military operations against the Palestinians. The resulting 
statistical analysis focuses on Israeli decision making in this exchange and poses the 
following question: Given that a decision to attack was made, did the value of the target 
 118
and the type of prospect frame affect Israeli sensitivity to the likely cost in Palestinian 
civilian casualties? The results provide an indication that both target value and prospect 
frame may affect the incidence of civilian casualties in the real world in a manner 
consistent with the targeting model and as shown by the two experiments. Furthermore, 
this evidence comes from the decision-making process of a democratic country other 
than the United States, pointing to the potential generalizability of the model. 
This chapter will first describe how the statistical test was designed, to include a 
discussion of the data, the model, the variables, the hypotheses, and the statistical 
method. Following this the results will be presented.  
 
DESIGN 
This section will proceed in four parts. The first will discuss how the structure of 
this analysis was designed using the targeting decision model. Next, the data sources will 
be described. The following paragraphs will then present the variables, the detailed 
statistical model, and the hypotheses. Finally, the method of analysis selected will be 
justified and described.  
 
Testing the Targeting Decision Model 
The structural view of the targeting decision model presented in Chapter III (see 
Figure 3.1) expected inputs in the form of context, benefits, and costs that were then 
combined into a decision either to attack or not attack. Using these conceptual terms, the 
targeting decision model was expressed in a dynamic manner as the following equation: 
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Attack Decisiont = Benefitst + Costst + Contextt-λ + c 
 
 
In this equation, or conceptual model, the attack decision, the benefits, and the 
costs were all coincident in time. The timing of the context inputs was more flexible 
since preceding events could have lasting impacts on the decision environment. Yet, this 
equation was not amenable to direct testing using observed data for two reasons. First, 
only decisions that resulted in attacks on a target would produce observable results, 
permitting inference that the attack decision occurred. However, do-not-attack decisions 
would not be likely to produce any externally observable indications. This limitation 
would prevent any test of the model that posed questions about whether or not an attack 
did or did not occur. Thus, the conceptual model above was modified to reflect the 
assumption that it would only describe attacks that had taken place.  This was done by 
reducing the left-hand side of the equation to a constant and rearranging terms as shown 
below: 
 
Costst = Benefitst + Contextt-λ + c        GIVEN: Decision to attack 
 
In this revised conceptual model that presupposes an attack decision, the 
expected costs and benefits now represent the values upon which the choice to attack 
was based. This decision, according to the law of war, is made via determinations of 
military necessity and proportionality. If the target offers a significant enough benefit 
toward victory, it can be deemed militarily necessary. That benefit is then traded off 
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against the anticipated harm to civilians in order to determine proportionality. For an 
attack decision to result, the anticipated benefit should outweigh the cost. However, the 
influence of context is not mentioned in the law of war as a component of the 
proportionality determination, yet is expected by the conceptual model to play a key role 
in the process. As reflected in the targeting decision model and seen in the two 
experiments, the context input of prospect frame can affect the risk attitudes of decision 
makers and influence both how and what they decide. Thus, the conceptual Intifada 
model reflects the costs, benefits, and context that resulted in the choice to attack.  
Second, the conceptual model was not ready for testing because both the original 
and the revised equations required specific information about the anticipated benefit of 
the target being considered and the predicted risk of civilian casualties in the course of 
the strike. These kinds of information were considered protected data by their respective 
governments, so were not available for use in this test. This required the location of 
externally observable proxy measures for these important variables. Data for the context 
inputs in the conceptual model was expected to be less difficult to find.  
 
Data 
The necessary data was found in databases the coincided with a multi-year period 
of the second Intifada, an uprising of the Palestinians against the Israelis that began in 
2000 and continued up to this writing. Within that conflict, a very active period from 
September 23, 2000 to December 20, 2006 was selected for analysis. That time period 
was marked with numerous terror attacks by Palestinian militants against Israel and by 
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frequent military operations by Israel against the militants. These Israeli military 
responses often resulted in Palestinian civilian casualties. Another reason this historical 
event was a good candidate for evaluation was the democratic form of government in 
Israel.  
Furthermore, proxies were available from among these data to represent the cost, 
benefit, and context terms in the conceptual model of attacks. By assuming that actual 
results were acceptable estimates of a-priori expectations, the number of actual 
Palestinian civilian deaths could be used to populate the cost term. Similarly, the number 
of actual Palestinian militant deaths, whether killed by general military operations or 
individually targeted, could suffice to fill in the benefits term. For contextual inputs, the 
frequent terror attacks on Israeli soil could be expected to affect the decision 
environment of Israeli political and military leaders. Also, three Israeli elections during 
the period were also anticipated to be pertinent events affecting the context of Israeli 
decision making. These selections for model inputs will be explained more below. 
Event data for terrorist attacks during the second Intifada were found in the 
Terrorism Knowledge Base® assembled by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism (MIPT 2007). Event data for civilian casualties were drawn from the 
extensive second Intifada fatalities database built by B’Tselem: The Israeli Information 
Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem 2007). This database 
recorded individual deaths accompanied by a number of descriptive parameters. This 
data was the most detailed source found to date and the only one that could serve as a 
means to approximate the count of Palestinian civilian deaths. 
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Over 99% of the Palestinian attacks against Israeli targets during this period were 
against non-military targets such as Jewish settlements within the Occupied Territories, 
small Israeli towns, or the large metropolitan centers of Israel. The intensity of these 
terror attacks ranged from the firing of rifle shots and mortar bombs in isolated areas to 
suicide bombers and car bombs in large urban centers. In response, the Israeli 
government launched over 200 airstrikes and mounted frequent ground operations aimed 
at Palestinian militants and leaders during that period. Table 6.1 provides a high-level 
description of the events reflected in the data. 
The entries in the B’Tselem casualty database that were useful for this test were 
date, cause of death, whether the person “died while fighting,” whether the Israeli 
operation was a targeted killing, and, if so, whether the casualty was the targeted 
individual. Individuals were not overtly labeled as civilians in the database, but were 
coded this way in the dataset for research purposes if the victim neither died while 
fighting nor was the object of a targeted killing. The MIPT terror database offered the 
following useful entries: date, location, and number killed.31 No information was 
available that directly described the number or nature of Israeli military missions during 
this period. However, Israeli forces were continuously present in the Occupied 
Territories throughout this period, so operations were considered to be continuous.  
These data were used to build a set of daily cases that documented both the terror 
attacks by Palestinians against Israelis, as well as the Palestinian casualties that resulted 
                                                 
31 Number of Israelis injured by the terror attacks was also available, but was highly correlated with the 
number killed, so was not included in the analysis. Since Palestinian injuries were not included in the 
B’Tselem casualty database, the model’s focus on fatalities is the same on both sides of the conflict.  
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from Israeli military operations on each day. The time interval of a single day was the 
shortest possible given the two databases that were merged. Additional consolidation 
was not done in order to maximize the detail of the dataset. 
 
Table 6.1 
Summary of Scope of Second Intifada Data Set 
 
Number Descriptor 
187 Terror Attacks in Core Areas of Israel 
671 Terror Attacks in Periphery of Israel 
1694 Terror Attacks in Occupied Territories 
1145 Israelis Killed by Terror Attacks 
4739 Israelis Injured by Terror Attacks 
  
1915 Palestinian Civilians Killed* by Israeli Military Ops 
1246 Palestinian Militants Killed* by Israeli Military Ops 
210 Palestinian Militants Killed via Targeted Killing 
  
2307 Days in Data Set 
837 Days with >1 Palestinian Civilian Fatality 
546 Days with >1 Palestinian Militant Fatality 
108 Days with >1 Targeted Killing of Palestinians 
304 Days with >1 Israeli Death from a Terror Attack 
167 Days with >1 Terror Attack in Core Areas of Israel 
477 Days with >1 Terror Attack in Israel (Periphery) 
Data set spans the period from 8/27/00 to 12/20/06 
 
 
 
The Intifada Harm Model, Variables, and Hypotheses 
Bringing together the conceptual model described above and the available data 
resulted in the following model of harm in the second Intifada: 
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Also, a graphical depiction of how the data and the model were merged appears in 
Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 
Intifada Data and Targeting Decision Model 
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and range of this variable and the seven independent variables about to be described. 
While the structural view of the targeting decision model lists other potential 
contributors and considerations regarding cost, this model focuses solely on the 
humanitarian aspect. This fosters a parallel construct with the experimental scenarios 
where humanitarian harm was the only component of cost that was manipulated.  
 
Table 6.2 
Per-Day Mean and Range of Variables  
in Intifada Harm Model  
 
Independent Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Cost Term    
 CIVILIAN_DEAD .83 0 23 
Benefit Terms    
 MILITANT_DEAD .54 0 12 
 TARGETED_KILL .09 0 6 
Context Terms    
 TERROR_CAS (3 days) 1.49 0 59 
 LOCATION_CORE (3 days) .24 0 5 
 LOCATION_PERIPHERY (3 days) .87 0 13 
 LEGIS_CAMPAIGN (Dummy) 0 1 
 PM_CAMPAIGN (Dummy) 0 1 
 
 
Additionally, there is anecdotal evidence that humanitarian harm mattered to Israeli 
decision makers while attacking Palestinian adversaries during this timeframe. 
Blumenfeld (2006) described Israeli military and political leaders struggling under a 
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difficult targeting dilemma. Based on an interview of the then-chief of the Israeli Air 
Force, these leaders were described as they considered both target benefit and civilian 
casualty cost in the course of an opportunity to attack a long-wanted terrorist 
mastermind. According to the account, the leaders eventually decided to forgo the attack 
because of the potentially high number of civilian casualties involved. 
The right-hand side of the equation represented the following assumptions and 
operationalizations based on the available data. The first two independent variables 
together represented the estimate of the anticipated benefit of Israeli military operations 
on a given day. MILITANT_DEAD was taken directly from the conceptual model and 
held the daily count of Palestinian militants killed. Each MILITANT_DEAD value 
corresponded to the same day as the CIV_DEAD value. CIV_DEAD was expected to be 
positively related to MILITANT_DEAD because higher amounts of humanitarian harm 
should be justified by greater amounts of military benefit in order to be considered 
proportional.  
 
• H11 (Military Operations) – The daily number of Palestinian civilian 
fatalities will be positively related to the number of Palestinian militants 
killed on that same day. 
 
 
Benefit was also represented in the operational model by TARGETED_KILL, 
the number of Palestinians who died each day because they were singled out by an 
Israeli military operation referred to as a targeted killing. Since this type of operation 
was used for high-value targets, this variable served to indicate when the benefit of 
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military operations for a given day was expected to be large. TARGETED_KILL was 
indexed to the same day as CIV_DEAD. CIV_DEAD was expected to increase as 
TARGETED_KILL and expected benefit went up, reflecting the same type of 
proportionality-related interaction between target and harm that had been seen at points 
in the experimental results. 
 
• H12 (High-Value Target) – The daily number of Palestinian civilian 
fatalities will be positively related to the number of Palestinian militants 
who were objects of targeted killings on that same day. 
 
 
TERROR_DEAD, LOCATION_CORE, and LOCATION_PERIPHERY were all 
operationalizations of the context input and reflected prospect framing. These variables 
were based on the assumption that terror attacks would induce a frame of loss, while the 
absence of terror strikes would result in a frame of gain. However, not all terror attacks 
were expected to exert equal influence in this way. As terror attacks killed more Israelis, 
and as these attacks occurred closer to the heartland of Israel, their ability to induce a 
negative frame would be greater. TERROR_DEAD counted the number of Israelis killed 
daily. LOCATION_CORE tracked the number of terror attacks that occurred in the core 
areas of Israel, defined to be Jerusalem, metro Tel Aviv, and Haifa. 
LOCATION_PERIPHERY did the same for the remainder of Israel, excluding the 
Occupied Territories.32 All three of these terms were not indexed to the same day as 
CIV_DEAD, but held the cumulative total of their descriptor over the previous three 
                                                 
32 A third variable, LOCATION_OT, held the counts of terrorist attacks in the Occupied Territories. It was 
not included in the model to avoid multicollinearity. 
 128
days.33 CIV_DEAD was expected to increase as TERROR_DEAD, 
LOCATION_CORE, and LOCATION_PERIPHERY increased, shifting the frame in a 
negative direction, making Israeli leaders more risk acceptant, and making potential 
civilian harm less relative. 
 
• H13 (Terror Event Casualty Framing) – The higher the number of Israeli 
fatalities and injuries due to terror attacks over the previous three days, 
the higher the number of Palestinian civilian fatalities that are expected to 
occur during military operations on a given day. 
• H14 (Terror Event Location Framing) – The higher the number of terror 
attacks in the core of Israel over the previous three days, the higher the 
number of Palestinian civilian fatalities expected to occur. 
 
 
The final two variables in the model, LEGIS_CAMPAIGN and 
PM_CAMPAIGN, were also context inputs, but were not associated with prospect 
framing. Instead, they explored the role of another aspect of the decision environment 
from the targeting decision model: the domestic feedback loop. The expectation was that 
the manner in which Israeli decision makers conducted military operations would be 
affected by the reelection campaigns as these sitting leaders sought votes. During the 
six-year period spanned by the data, two legislative elections and one special election for 
prime minister occurred in Israel.34 The legislative election campaign periods were 
limited by law to the 101-day timeframe preceding the election (Library of Congress 
                                                 
33 Sensitivity tests were performed using other individual day lags and cumulative lags up to 2 weeks .The 
3-day cumulative lag was the most reasonable and was significant in the model. 
34 The two legislative election dates were January 28, 2003 and March 28, 2006. A special election for 
prime minister took place on February 6, 2001. 
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2009). The election for prime minister was preceded by a 60-day campaign period.35 
LEGIS_CAMPAIGN and PM_CAMPAIGN were dummy variables that indicated the 
presence or absence of their respective campaign period. Public attitudes of the Israeli 
public and the incumbents would be critical to predicting the direction of the effect of a 
political campaign period on CIV_DEAD. This background work was left for future 
research and no hypotheses for the campaign variables were formulated.  
 
Method of Analysis  
The Intifada harm model posed two related challenges to analysis. First, the 
model sought to account for a dynamic process. The expectation was that prospect frame 
and the decisions to respond with military force were contingent on terror attacks that 
had already occurred. Because this process was unobserved, the length of time that 
mattered between terror attack and military response was not empirically apparent. 
Second, the independence over time of Israeli decisions regarding military responses 
was uncertain. Given that there were likely to be multiple terror attacks within a period 
of time, the role of previous Israeli decisions and the outcomes of those decisions would 
reasonably impact a current choice.  
Similarly, there were several characteristics of the data that also influenced the 
choice of the means of statistical analysis. First, the civilian casualty dependent variable 
was composed of discrete counts. According to Greene (2003, 663), conventional 
regression is not a generally suitable approach for this type of data. Next, the data was 
                                                 
35 The special election was precipitated by the resignation of the incumbent on December 9, 2000. 
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aggregated at the daily level in order to maximize the information content and time 
precision within the available data. However, this highlighted a rare events issue in the 
data: the dependent variable field contained mostly zeros. Within the data set there were 
2307 days, but only 837 of those days contained one or more civilian casualties, leaving 
64% of the field as zeros. This problematic situation can lead to both bias and selection 
effect problems in the analysis results (King and Zeng 2001, 693).36   
Because of the count-nature of the dependent variable, the Poisson regression 
model (PRM) was the first model considered. This statistical model is based on the 
Poisson distribution, a univariate set of curves determined by the equation below and by 
the value of μ , the single value of both the distribution’s mean and variance, as shown 
below:  
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The PRM allows each observation to have its own value of μ  to incorporate observed 
heterogeneity, or variations, inherent across the data (Long and Freese 2003, 251 and 
266). However, Long and Freese caution that the PRM rarely fits the data because it 
underestimates the amount of heterogeneity that still remains in the data. This causes the 
data to be overdispersed with respect to the PRM’s outcome (Long and Freese 2005). 
                                                 
36 Although King and Zeng discuss this and the finite sample problem in the context of probability models, 
the difficulty posed to event count models is expected to be much the same. 
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Furthermore, the results will give overly large Z values and overly small p values 
because the standard errors will be biased downward. 
The second model considered was the negative binomial regression model 
(NBRM), which was designed to correct the weaknesses of the PRM (Long & Freese 
2005). Greene (2003, 744) points out that the NBRM improves fit by relaxing the 
assumption that the mean and the variance of each observation must be the same. Long 
and Freese (2005) explain that while the NBRM retains the assumption that the counts 
are distributed as a Poisson, it adds an uncorrelated error term that is drawn from a 
gamma distribution to model the additional heterogeneity missed by the PRM. This 
causes the resulting probability model to be a negative binomial distribution in terms of 
α, the measure of the dispersion in the data. This statistic can then be used as test statistic 
to determine whether overdispersion is present and the NBRM is justified over the PRM. 
When the operational model was estimated using the NBRM, α indicated that the 
NBRM provided a better fit than the PRM. In some cases, zero-inflated models are 
necessary to properly handle a high-zero-count process. Long and Freese (2005, 274) 
explain that these approaches use two separate zero-generating processes: one models 
observations that are always zero, the other models observations that are not always 
zero. However, when a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZIBN) method was used to fit 
the operational model, the Vuong test, advocated by Greene (2003, 751), indicated that 
the NBRM was preferred over the ZIBN. 
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RESULTS 
When the operational model was estimated using the NBRM, all but two terms 
were significant (see Table 6.3). The two insignificant terms were 
LOCATION_PERIPHERY and PM_CAMPAIGN. Of the remaining independent 
variables, TARGETED KILL was the most strongly correlated with CIV_DEATHS, 
with an incidence rate ratio (IRR) of 1.45 (Z = 5.18, p < .001).37 This is an important 
result. Not only did increased target benefit raise the acceptable number of civilian 
casualties (H12), but its impact on the cost term was larger than any other variable in the 
model. The count of militant deaths posted the second-highest positive relationship with 
the dependent variable (IRR = 1.35, Z = 10.84, p < .001). The role of 
MILITANT_DEAD was in accordance with H11: the higher the number of militants 
killed on a given day, the higher the number of civilians killed as well.  
The location of a terror attack in the core areas of Israel also reflected a relatively 
strong correlation with the dependent variable (IRR = 1.20, Z = 2.60, p < .01), although 
that of the number of fatalities from terror attacks was significant, but markedly weaker 
(IRR = 1.02, Z = 2.33, p < .05). H13 and H14 anticipated that such attacks in the core and 
fatal attacks during the previous three days would drive a negative frame for decisions 
about Israeli military responses, making them more likely to result in civilian casualties. 
These results show that in the case of the second Intifada the location of terror attacks in 
the “heart” of the country had a stronger impact than the lethality of terror attacks. 
Finally, Israeli legislative election campaigns were associated with a substantial drop in 
                                                 
37 The IRR provides the expected change in the dependent variable given a one-unit change in the 
independent variable. 
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Palestinian civilian casualties (IRR = .68, Z = -2.49, p < .05). This result offers 
interesting fodder for future research into the role of domestic feedback in this particular 
conflict and its targeting decision process.  
 
Table 6.3 
Contributions of Independent Variables 
to Intifada Harm Model 
 
Independent 
Variable Coefficient Z p 
Incident 
Rate 
Ratio 
MILITANT_DEAD .301*** 10.84 .000 1.35 
TARGETED_KILL .369*** 5.18 .000 1.45 
TERROR_DEAD # .021* 2.33 .020 1.02 
LOCATION_CORE # .180** 2.60 .009 1.20 
LOCATION_PERIPHERY # .013 .55 .580 1.01 
LEG_CAMPAIGN -.381* -2.49 .013 .68 
PM_CAMPAIGN -.514 -1.81 .070 .60 
Constant -.603*** -11.45 .000 -- 
* p < .05    ** p < .01    *** p < .005 
#  Cumulative count over the previous 3 days 
 
 
Table 6.4 displays various scenarios posed to the Intifada harm model, as well as 
the number of civilian casualties it predicted. Also provided is the expected probability 
of one or more civilian casualties given the values of the independent variables. These 
predictions were generated using the PRVALUE post-estimation command written for 
Stata by Long and Freese (2005). While the IRR values discussed above are one way to 
understand how each right-hand-side variable affects the model’s output while holding 
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other variables at their means, PRVALUE permits the researcher to control the value of 
all inputs simultaneously in order to explore specific circumstances.  
 
Table 6.4 
Impact of Harm of Modeled Intifada Scenarios 
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 Average Day .73 .369 --- 
 
μ μ μ μ 0 0 
+1 Militant Casualty .98 .429 +.060 
 
μ +1 μ μ μ 0 0 
+1 Targeted Killing 1.05 .442 +.073 
 
μ μ +1 μ μ 0 0 
+1 Terror Casualty .74 .373 +.004 
 
μ μ μ +1 μ 0 0 
+1 Terror Attack in Core .87 .405 +.036 
 
μ μ μ μ +1 0 0 
Active Legislative 
Election Campaign .50 .297 -.073 
 
μ μ μ μ 1 0 
Active Prime Minister 
Election Campaign .43 .273 -.096 
 
μ μ μ μ 0 1 
            
Mo
re
 T
er
ro
r 
1 Terror Attack in Core 
with 5 Deaths .90 .411 +.042 
 
μ μ 5 1 0 0 
2 Terror Attacks in Core 
with 20 Deaths 1.47 .509 +.140 
 
μ μ 20 2 0 0 
5 Terror Attacks in Core 
with 59 Deaths 5.70 .734 +.365 
 
μ μ 59 5 0 0 
            
Mo
re
 
Ta
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d 
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gs
 3 Targeted Killings 2.13 .579 +.210 
 
μ 3 μ μ 0 0 
6 Targeted Killings 6.44 .745 +.376 
 
μ 6 μ μ 0 0 
 # Estimated using PRVALUE (Long and Freese 2005) 
## Sum of events over previous 3 days 
μ = mean across entire period in data set 
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The uppermost section of Table 6.4 increments each independent variable 
separately to characterize their individual effects. The magnitudes of the effects are 
relatively the same as the IRR values in Table 6.3. The bottom two sections show what 
might be expected if either terror attack or targeted killings increased. In the first set, 
one, two, or five terror attacks occurred in the core areas of Israel in a three-day period. 
Each attack was accompanied by 5, 20, and 59 fatalities, respectively. The upper ends of 
these characteristics were the maximums that appeared in the data set. In these scenarios, 
the predicted number of civilian casualties on that day grew from 0.9 to 5.7. In the last 
set, either three or six targeted killings occurred. These raised the expected number of 
Palestinian civilian casualties to 2.1 and then 6.4.  
Because this is a correlational analysis, there is the possibility that the variation 
in civilian casualties is not due to different sensitivities to the costs, as has been expected 
in the hypotheses here. A possible alternative explanation for the correlation between 
militant and civilian deaths is the realities of urban warfare: when combatants and 
noncombatants are intermingled, the number killed from each category will be linked. If 
this is the case, then the MILITANT_DEATH term would offer no support for the 
existence of the expected benefit-cost tradeoff. However, this same explanation would 
not explain the stronger positive relationship between the numbers of targeted killings 
and civilian casualties. Here, the expected larger benefit of these targets was 
proportional to the higher number of civilian casualties per targeted killing—a result that 
is not consistent with the co-location rationale.  
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However, another possible mechanism that might be in operation to explain the 
relationship of harm to targeted killings is the type of weapons used. If the weapons used 
to kill high-priority targets were very powerful and inherently indiscriminate this could 
account for the larger number of civilian deaths that were associated with targeted 
killings. Yet, these strikes are planned in advance, during which weapons are selected 
from an array of possibilities. The fact that a particular weapon is likely to result in 
greater damage to a target’s surroundings is known to the decision maker, yet the 
weapon is chosen despite the likely humanitarian harm. Thus, the selection of the 
weapon is in itself a statement of sensitivity to the cost of civilian casualties. 
 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has explained the design and test of a statistical model of civilian 
casualties during a six-year period of the second Intifada. Central in this dynamic 
Intifada harm model was an unobservable process where Israeli political and military 
leaders chose how to conduct military operations creating varying degrees of risk of 
Palestinian civilian casualties. This process was assumed to work in accordance with the 
structural view of the targeting decision process.  
Based on the decision inputs of benefit and context, the statistical model 
estimated the cost in term of the number of Palestinian civilian casualties which Israeli 
decision makers were willing to incur in the course of their military operations. This was 
done using a daily data set of event counts and a negative-binomial estimator. The two 
decision inputs with the strongest positive relationships to the resulting number of 
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civilian casualties were target benefit, as represented by the number of targeted killings, 
and losing frame, in the form of the count of terror attacks in the core areas of Israel. 
These results supported the expectations of the targeting decision model. Higher benefits 
from attacking were anticipated to drive up civilian casualties as decision makers acted 
to secure those benefits with less regard to cost. Attacks in the “heart” of Israel were also 
expected to place decision makers in the domain of loss, where they would be risk prone 
and find cost-related information to be less relevant. The outcome was anticipated to be 
higher civilian casualty rates, which proved to be the result.  
Of particular note is that the rate of civilian casualties resulting from terror 
attacks in the core of Israel was higher than that from targeted killings. This points to 
prospect frame being a stronger influence than target benefit, given the assumptions of 
the model. In the experimental tests of the targeting decision model, target benefit 
exerted a significant influence on the decision to attack or not, while prospect frame was 
statistically not significant in this choice. Therefore, the Intifada harm model has not 
only provided evidence of the target decision model operating in an actual conflict and 
in an international setting, but also pointed to prospect frame operating as theoretically 
expected. 
What this analysis has not addressed are issues related to decisions not to attack. 
It cannot help to characterize the points at which costs are too high or benefits are too 
low that a planned attack is cancelled. Additionally, some will recognize that the urban 
environment of the second Intifada, by itself alone, would be expected to increase the 
rate of civilian casualties. While this is true, the fact that the rate of harm varies with 
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target value, and especially the high payoffs expected from targeted killings, supports 
the hypothesis that civilian casualties are also a function of the benefit expected by the 
Israelis from their military operations. Another distinct shortcoming of the dynamic 
count model used in this test is its inability to correct for autocorrelation in the data. 
Brandt et al. (2000) and Brandt and Williams (2001) critique the use of Poisson and 
negative binomial estimators to evaluate time-dependent data because of the inability of 
these models to account for recurring time dependencies in the data. Instead, they 
recommend the Poisson Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (PEWMA) or the 
Poisson Autoregressive (Poisson AR(p)) models. However, refinement of the Intifada 
harm model using these improved models is left for future research. 
Given these caveats, the results from analyzing the data from this conflict 
provide an interesting insight into a possible mechanism behind some of the previous 
research results discussed in Chapter II. Valentino, Huth, and Croco (2006) and Downes 
(2007) all pointed to democracies as significant sources of civilian casualties in war, 
despite the liberal values of these states. However, if one considers determinations of 
proportionality to be not only matters of costs and benefits, but also of context, the 
higher rates of humanitarian harm at the hands of democracies may be more easily 
explained. This connection will be further discussed in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation sought out insights into the micro-foundations of wartime 
decision making by democratic governments in the face of likely, but unintended, harm 
to foreign civilians. This concluding chapter will review the motivation for this research, 
highlight the influences and conditions found to affect these decisions, and discuss 
implications for theory, methods, and policy. It will then close with a focus on the next 
steps in continuing this research. 
 
MOTIVATION AND APPROACH 
A governmental leader faces a quandary. His democratic nation is at war and its 
military forces have located an important enemy military target for which they have been 
searching a long time. Yet, because of the target’s location, attacking it will also risk 
killing a substantial number of local civilians. Aware of the precepts of Just War and 
international law that require proportionality between benefit and cost in situations like 
this, he considers his alternatives. The leader would like to wait for another opportunity 
that is unencumbered by the risk of civilian casualties, but is told that the target will 
move soon and there is no guarantee that it can be located again. The leader asks for 
attack options and is told that a single one-ton bomb is highly likely to destroy the target, 
but also will kill many civilians. Alternatively, a smaller bomb could be used to reduce 
the civilian casualties, but would also make the escape of the target more likely. A 
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request for legal counsel returns only a response that, given the target and the broad 
bounds of discretion permitted by international law, either one of the options is legal. To 
maximize his nation’s security, should he destroy the target, knowing that this will kill 
many civilians who are his responsibility to protect? To uphold his nation’s beliefs in the 
value of the human lives threatened by the attack, should he allow the target to escape to 
fight against his nation again? Try as he might, he cannot find a third, more acceptable 
option to resolve this dilemma. 
How does the leader make this choice? How do similar political and military 
leaders in other democracies make decisions about how they will fight when faced with 
dilemmas between national security and humanitarian harm? To assist in answering 
these questions, this dissertation constructed a targeting decision model that described 
both the theorized structure of the decision inputs and the process by which these inputs 
are assembled into a choice. The model reflected decision inputs in the form of the 
benefits to be gained from the target, the costs of likely civilian casualties, and the 
context of the decision. One component of the context input that was of particular 
interest was the decision frame, as adapted from prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). According to this theory, frames of gain will lead decision makers to be 
risk adverse, while frames of loss will cause them to be more accepting of risky options. 
The targeting decision model also based its explanation of how a choice evolves on the 
precepts of Cognitive Calculus (Geva, Mayhar, and Skorich 2000), depicting the 
evolution of the decision as an online process that incorporates each new piece of 
information serially. Each information item then moved the decision maker closer to one 
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of two decision thresholds. Reaching a threshold made the choice and stopped the 
decision process.  
This model was then tested using two experiments and a statistical analysis of 
data collected from an actual conflict. The experiments took 355 experienced military 
officers and DoD civilians and exposed them to a short wartime targeting scenario in 
which they were given a high- or low-value target and a large or small estimate of likely 
civilian casualties. The participants were also given a description of either their current 
prospects for success or for failure in the conflict. Combinations of these three factors—
target value, humanitarian harm, and prospect frame—created eight experimental 
conditions in light of which the participants’ attack or not-attack choices were evaluated. 
In order to maintain the necessary level of experimental control, all participants made 
their decisions having been told that additional options were not available, that their 
targets were legal under international law, and that the expected civilian casualties were 
deemed to be proportional by the legal experts. 
The first of these two experiments ensured that all participants saw the same 
sequence of information items and only made their decisions about attacking the target at 
the end. Participants self-reported their CCPs after each item, indicating the decision 
toward which they were leaning and how strongly they felt about that position. This 
format permitted clear comparisons of the effects of target, harm, and frame on these 
CCPs across all eight conditions. The second experiment modified this format to permit 
investigation of how each of the combinations of target, harm, and frame would 
influence the participants’ search for information and the timing of their decision. Using 
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this approach, participants were permitted a greater degree of flexibility both in selecting 
information to view and in choosing the point at which they would make their decision. 
All analyses were done using analysis of variance or covariance techniques. 
In order to determine if the targeting decision model was applicable outside of 
the laboratory, a statistical analysis was done using data from a six-year period of the 
second Intifada. Within this Israeli-Palestinian conflict, evidence was sought of 
influence by target benefit and prospect frame on the sensitivity of Israeli decision 
makers to the cost of Palestinian civilian casualties. This analysis was restricted because 
only externally collectible data was available for use, so only actual attacks could be 
explored and not the do-not-attack decisions which left no externally measurable 
evidence. An original data set comprised of daily counts of Palestinian civilian and 
militant casualties was used. Also included were “high-value” Palestinians targeted and 
killed by the Israeli military. The primary contextual inputs for Israeli decision makers 
coded in the data set were the location and lethality of terror attacks by Palestinians 
against Israelis. The statistical analysis was done with a dynamic version of a negative 
binomial estimator.  
Some components of the targeting decision model were intentionally not 
explored in this dissertation in order to focus the research and provide multiple 
perspectives on the aspects of the model that were selected for investigation. Three 
excluded aspects of this decision process are listed here. The first was issues of judgment 
regarding the innocence of civilians at risk of being harmed. Many would assert that 
innocence is a matter of judgment rather than a label of a class of individuals. In this 
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research, civilian status was equated to innocence. A related issue involves the strategic 
placement of civilians in military areas and military targets in civilian areas. These 
practices have become increasingly common, making the application of the principles of 
discrimination much more difficult to apply. Finally, the process of minimizing civilian 
casualties also involves a search for alternatives. Variations in means, timing, and 
direction of strike are sometimes available to planners to provide a means of attack that 
better minimizes humanitarian harm. However, sometimes resource limitations, the 
fleeting nature of the target, or other realities force choices between otherwise 
undesirable options. It was these kinds of dilemmas that this dissertation particularly 
sought to better understand. 
 
FINDINGS 
Each of the three factors—target benefit, civilian casualty cost, and prospect 
frame—affected both the targeting decision made and the evolution of that choice. 
Sometimes this influence was conditional. When this was the case, the conditions will be 
explained below as each of the major propositions is reviewed along with the associated 
results. 
 
Benefit of Target 
The benefits derived from attacking the target mattered to the decision makers. In 
the experiments, the participants were expected to be able to determine the contribution 
of their assigned target toward eventual victory in the conflict and to choose more 
 144
frequently to attack a high-value target than a low-value one. This was what occurred in 
both experiments, with significantly more support being expressed for attacking the 
high-value target than the low-value one regardless of the outcome dependent variable 
used. Target benefit also was observed in the decision process analysis as a 
consideration that had an immediate effect on CCP levels and maintained that effect 
throughout the remainder of the scenario. Because the Intifada data only included attacks 
that actually occurred, the associated analysis could not address the role of benefit alone. 
However, the high-value targets were associated with greater amounts of harm when the 
attack was made, as will be discussed below.  
 
Cost of Civilian Casualties 
The amount of humanitarian harm threatened by the attack also mattered. 
Experiment participants were well aware of the requirements of the law of war to 
minimize civilian casualties and of their government’s commitment to upholding those 
requirements. Because of this, they were expected to show less support for an attack that 
was likely to result in a large number of unintended civilian deaths and more support 
when the expected civilian casualties were low. This was the clear result in both the first 
and second experiment according to each of the measures of support. When looking at 
the evolution of participants’ choices, the introduction of the civilian casualty estimate 
resulted in the greatest amount of change in participant support throughout the entire 
scenario. Again, because the Intifada analysis did not have observations corresponding 
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to the attacks that did not occur, it could not comment on the role of civilian casualties 
alone.  
 
Benefit and Cost 
With respect to the decision makers’ sensitivity to the humanitarian cost of the 
attack, the amount of benefit from the target also mattered. This relationship was 
significant in the Intifada data analysis, but much less consistent in the experimental 
results. Where it occurred, the interaction between target and harm demonstrated that the 
dilemma between the protection of national security and the avoidance of humanitarian 
harm was not always resolved in the same way. It was anticipated that decision makers 
faced with decisions of proportionality would be more sensitive to likely humanitarian 
harm when the benefit offered by striking the target was low. Conversely, they were 
expected to be less sensitive when the anticipated benefit was great. Support was found 
for this proposition during the decision process in the first experiment, but not in the 
final choices in either experiment.38 When the civilian casualty estimate was introduced 
in Experiment 1, the participants were already aware of their assigned target. Their 
support ratings at that point in the scenario showed a strong distinction in how the 
combination of target and harm estimate affected their support. If their target value was 
high, the number of civilian casualties mattered less in their support for the attack than 
when the target value was low. Because the participants in Experiment 2 were allowed to 
access information in the order they chose, a similar analysis was not possible in that 
                                                 
38 Both outcome variables in both experiments reflected a weak trend in the expected direction. 
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test. However, the analysis of the Intifada data also offered support for the interaction of 
benefit and cost. On the days where more targeted killings of high-value Palestinians 
occurred, the significantly higher rates of Palestinian civilian casualties pointed to a 
lower sensitivity to humanitarian harm by Israeli political and military leadership.  
Humanitarian norms and laws have been assumed to be the source of costs in the 
targeting decision model and the three tests included in this dissertation. However, as 
discussed in Chapter III, these costs can also arise from strategic concerns with similar 
results in the decision outcomes. In actuality, costs are likely calculated on the basis of 
both humanitarian and strategic concerns, but the results of the tests are not expected to 
be sensitive to this distinction. 
 
Frame of Prospects for Success or Failure 
The influence of prospect frame on risk attitudes was sometimes conditional and 
other times general in nature. The losing frame was expected to make decision makers 
more risk prone and thus willing to accept higher civilian casualties as a result of the 
attack. In both experiments, this was not the case in general but did hold in the high-
stakes conditions, where both the target value and the estimate of harm were high. When 
confronted with this difficult tradeoff between a benefit that they strongly desired and a 
cost that they would much rather avoid, participants were significantly influenced by the 
information they had about their prospects for success or failure in the conflict. When 
they were losing, they showed more support for attacking the high-value target and 
exacting the associated high humanitarian cost than when they were winning. This 
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pattern of decision making also occurred in the Intifada data, but as a general result that 
applied across all six years of the conflict that were analyzed. In this test of the targeting 
decision model, prospect frame was assessed in terms of the proximity of recent 
Palestinian terror attacks to the heartlands of Israel, and, to a lesser degree, the lethality 
of those attacks. Given that, Israeli leaders in a losing frame were less sensitive to 
humanitarian harm and more willing to accept higher civilian casualty counts. 
Prospect frame was also a significant driver in how participants developed their 
choice in Experiment 2, the test that was specifically designed to permit the exploration 
of the decision process. Again, the frame was expected to affect risk attitudes, with risk-
prone decision makers in the domain of loss being less concerned with information about 
civilian casualties and quicker to make a choice than those who were in the domain of 
gain and risk averse. When participants were permitted greater control over the order in 
which they viewed information, they accessed more target-related information early in 
the process than when they were in the losing frame. Additionally, when in the high-
stakes conditions, a losing frame caused them to view more target- than harm-related 
information and less items overall, as well as to make decisions more quickly than 
participants in the winning frame. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
While these results are interesting in and of themselves, they are most important 
when they can be used to inform and expand existing understandings. Below, the 
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implications of the results from this dissertation will be discussed for IR theory, for 
research methodology, and for policy.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
The targeting decision model offers a promising approach to integrating prospect 
theory into a micro-level theoretical framework. In the tests of this model, both target 
benefit and civilian casualty costs worked as anticipated. The manipulation checks and 
some inconsistencies in the influence of prospect frame likely point to a weak 
manipulation of this factor in the two experiments. However, its influence in both the 
process and outcome of the high-stakes decisions was clearly significant. Prospect frame 
also offered a straightforward explanation for higher civilian casualty counts in the 
Intifada data. These kinds of results strengthen the evidence in favor of using prospect 
theory to explain decisions under conditions of risk in IR in general and in decision 
making in particular.  
One exception in the consistency between the experimental results and the 
model’s predictions was the behavior of decision makers in the Fool’s Bet conditions, 
where target value was low but estimated civilian casualties were high. In these 
situations, the prospect frames had the opposite effect as predicted, making those 
participants in the losing frame more sensitive to humanitarian harm than those in the 
winning frame. This exception was likely due to the markedly disproportional 
comparison of benefit and cost and the reality that attacks which are clearly violations of 
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international law bring additional costs over and above the loss of civilian lives. These 
unexpected results will be noted for future research using the targeting decision model. 
The expectations of Cognitive Calculus also proved to be accurate in these tests, 
providing a new source of supporting evidence for this framework. The operation of the 
online decision-making process and the decision thresholds were consistent with the 
behavior of the experiment participants. Furthermore, this initial attempt to test prospect 
theory’s implications within Cognitive Calculus offered better explanations for the 
outcome and process results than either construct would have if used separately.  
Despite the fact that the scenario used in both experiments depicted a “war of 
choice” for the American forces, the results are expected to be transportable to other 
forms of interstate conflict, as well as decisions to go to war. The focus of the 
experiments was targeting, a ubiquitous decision process in wars of all types. More 
specifically, the cost-benefit tradeoff that was observed is expected to be a pressing 
consideration within that targeting process wherever it might occur. Furthermore, the 
influence of framing on this tradeoff would likely be strengthened in certain wars, 
especially those of national necessity, whenever the penalties of failure are likely to be 
particularly dire. These same factors—cost, benefit, and frame—are also expected to be 
key considerations in decisions to go to war. In fact, the Just War criteria for the 
initiation of war use ideas very similar to the jus en bello criteria of necessity and 
proportionality.  
This model also offers possible insight into why researchers looking at civilian 
casualties in war have seen inconsistencies between the values a state professes and the 
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humanitarian harm it creates. While proportionality is considered to be a straightforward 
comparison of benefits and costs associated with a planned attack, the targeting decision 
model and the test results point out that tradeoffs can also vary with prospects for 
success or failure. This is consistent with several of the situations that Downes (2007) 
concluded were likely to lead to higher civilian casualties. Another way of viewing his 
categories of wars of attrition, wars of long duration, or wars with high military 
casualties is as wartime situations in which the decision makers perceive elevated 
prospects of losing. Such a negative frame would make decision makers more risk 
accepting and thus civilian casualties more likely. In this way, prospect frame offers a 
means to introduce additional parsimony and explanatory power into recent and future 
theorizing on civilian casualties in war. Furthermore, this role of prospect frame can be 
extended beyond the American experience with some confidence because of the positive 
results from the analysis of the Intifada data. 
 
Implications for Methodology 
Experimentation combined with the process-tracing features of Cognitive 
Calculus provided a rich approach to understanding better the evolution of decisions. 
While the multiple interim measures of CCP were somewhat obtrusive, they appear to 
have been well-tolerated by the participants. The post-hoc picture they provided of the 
decision process permitted insight into possible reasons for the inconsistencies in the 
frame manipulation and other nuances of participant behavior reserved for later study.  
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The testing of prospect frame within a moderately detailed experimental scenario 
was both productive and novel. Although the framing manipulation was weaker than 
intended, it still exerted significant influence in the interesting high-stakes conditions. As 
to novelty, most previous experimental research on prospect theory had either posed 
solitary questions with different wording (for example, Kahneman and Tversky 1979) or 
provided a short framing statement followed immediately by a question to determine the 
frame’s effect (for example, Broetcher 2004; Quatrrone and Tversky 1988). Thus, this 
attempt to use prospect framing to establish a context against which a scenario would 
unfold was both innovative and useful. Also, the coding of powerful background events, 
such as the terror attacks in the Intifada data set, proved to be another means to capture 
the role of prospect framing in decision making. 
The employment of a negative binomial count model in a dynamic fashion was 
an intuitive solution to the analysis challenge presented by the Intifada data. This 
approach can possibly be improved through future implementation of a method that can 
better account for time dependencies in the data. Two candidate approaches are the 
PEWMA and Poisson AR(p) models recommended by Brandt et al. (2000) and Brandt 
and Williams (2001). 
 
Policy Implications 
This research was designed to study how targeting decisions are made in the face 
of likely humanitarian harm and why leaders choose as they do. The study was 
intentionally neutral with respect to any possible legal or moral judgments of the 
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targeting decisions made during the experiments or the second Intifada. It is arguable 
that the precepts of Just War and international law only set boundaries on behavior and 
leave much up to the discretion of the “reasonable commander” in situations such as 
those studied here.  
The most significant insight from this dissertation for political and military 
leaders is that determinations of proportionality are not just exercises of logic where 
benefits and costs are counted and compared. As shown in this research, context intrudes 
on this process, making tradeoffs of the same costs and benefits deliver different 
outcomes depending on a decision maker’s prospects for success. Both experiments 
showed this to be the case in the particularly vexing situations where participants were 
forced to choose between striking a high-value target or averting the deaths of a large 
number of civilians in the target area. Additionally, the Intifada analysis identified 
framing as regularly affecting sensitivities to humanitarian harm in real-world decision 
making.  
According to the theoretical model, other context-related inputs may also affect 
choices in similar ways, but initial evidence is now available for the role of prospect 
framing. Given this evidence, the influence of prospects for success should be 
acknowledged and considered in decisions about the proportionality of attacks that 
threaten humanitarian harm. Whether this knowledge is used to apply some sort of 
correction, or merely as information, it is important for decision makers to make choices 
from positions of greater understanding—especially when those decisions may risk the 
lives of others. 
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NEXT STEPS 
There are three directions in which this research should now move. First, 
improved methods are needed for improving prospect framing manipulations as context 
in decision making experiment scenarios. The gap should be narrowed between the 
weakness of the text-only manipulation of prospect frame in these experiments and the 
inescapable infusion of prospects in actual crises. Exploiting the ties between prospect 
theory and negative emotions (see Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott 2004; Geva and 
Skorick 2003; Sirin and Geva 2007) is one promising avenue to the desired 
improvement. Use of images and audio to build a more immersive experience for 
experiment participants, as well as reinforcement of the desired frame at multiple points 
during the scenario, may also be helpful approaches.  
Second, there are multiple aspects of the targeting decision model yet to be 
investigated, both individually and in combination with each other. Two will be 
identified here. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the innocence of civilians in the 
theater of war is not always assumed and is sometimes highly doubtful. No small part of 
this problem is the prevalence of insurgencies and non-uniformed combatants in today’s 
landscape of warfare, making determinations of innocence by virtue of civilian attire a 
highly uncertain proposition. How the protection of civilians by international law is 
affected by perceptions of innocence and played out in determinations of proportionality 
in targeting decisions is a potentially fascinating future study. Another aspect of the 
model for investigation is the effect of probabilities surrounding target identification. 
The advent of new means of intelligence gathering offers additional resources to 
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decision makers that can increase confidence that a target’s identity is accurately 
characterized. Yet the age-old problems of mistakes by man and machine continue to 
plague the battlefield and misidentifications remain a problem. Because the initial tests 
of prospect theory were experiments involving gambles, it would be particularly 
interesting and pertinent to look at the interplay of prospect framing and varying 
probabilities of accurate target identification. 
Third, this line of research can be generalized into public administration settings 
and integrated with public administration theory to explain bureaucratic decision making 
in settings of high risk. This could be done in two ways. The first approach would be to 
recognize that many of the decision makers in the targeting process are also bureaucrats 
subject to control mechanisms such as the DoD’s top-down policy guidance, yet also 
possessing values of their own. This sets up interesting questions as to how the targeting 
decision model would interact with public administration theoretical frameworks such as 
principal-agent (see McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; or critique by Meier and 
O’Toole 2006) or those based on the inner checks of bureaucrats’ values (see Rohr 1989; 
Cooper 1991, Frederickson 1997; Terry 2003). A second approach would be to take the 
targeting decision model out of the international conflict setting and apply it in domestic 
governmental settings that involve high-risk decision making that is likely to result in 
harm to innocent citizens. One example would be decisions regarding the employment of 
elite police teams with powerful weapons to resolve dangerous security or criminal 
situations in crowded urban areas. Another applicable setting would be exploration of 
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choices as to when police will engage in high-speed chases on occupied roadways in an 
attempt to apprehend criminal suspects.39  
 
FINAL REMARKS 
Civilian casualties matter on today’s battlefield perhaps more than ever before. 
The commander of the U.S. Air Force contingent in Afghanistan commented recently in 
an interview about this transformation of political and military guidance:  
 
What has changed is this deeper understanding that …when the enemy 
[is] shooting at you from a village …instead of precisely trying to take out 
that enemy …you just withdraw. We have got to accept the fact that if one 
non-combatant is killed in this conflict, you could have 20 people pick up 
a rifle and fight against us as a result. So you may win the tactical battle, 
but you lose the overall war. (Holmes 2009) 
 
 
Given the degree of influence that civilian casualties are exerting in how democracies 
fight, the recent IR research into who and what generates more or less humanitarian 
harm on the battlefield is well timed. This dissertation has opened another branch of that 
research program by starting to answer questions about how and why decision makers 
choose sometimes to accept or reject those deaths as a necessary cost of war. 
 
                                                 
39 This idea was shared by Dr. Ken Meier, Texas A&M University, in August 2009. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENT 1 INSTRUMENT CONTENT 
 
NOTE:  The following screens are taken from the first experiment, which uses a fixed 
order of information presentation.  The second experiment, permitting variation in how 
information was accessed, contained the same information content. 
 
Welcome Screen………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Instruction Screen (1/2)…………………………………………………………………... 
 
 
 
Instruction Screen (2/2, Differs for Experiment 2)……………………………………….. 
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Scenario Screen (1/14, Introduction, Information Item 0)……………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Scenario Screen (2/14, Prospect Manipulation, Information Item 1)…………………… 
 
Either a “winning” prospect: 
 
 
…or a “not winning” prospect: 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Scenario Screen (3/14, Target Manipulation, Information Item 2)……………………… 
 
Either the “high-value” target:   
 
 
 
…or  the “moderate-value” target: 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Scenario Screen (4/14, Target Information, Information Item 3)………………………… 
 
For the “high-value” target: 
 
 
...or for the “moderate-value” target: 
 
 
 
Scenario Screen (5/14, Target Information, Information Item 4)………………………… 
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Scenario Screen (6/14, Target Information, Information Item 5)………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Screen (7/14, Target Information, Information Item 6)………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Screen (8/14, Target Information, Information Item 7)………………………… 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Scenario Screen (9/14, Civilian Casualty Manipulation, Information Item 8)…………… 
 
Either the “high” level of casualties: 
 
 
…or the “low” level of casualties: 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Scenario Screen (10/14, Civilian Casualty Information, Information Item 9)…………… 
 
For the “high” level of casualties:  
 
 
...or for the “low” level of casualties: 
 
 
 
Scenario Screen (11/14, Civilian Casualty Information, Information Item 10)………… 
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Scenario Screen (12/14, Civilian Casualty Information, Information Item 11)………… 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Screen (13/14, Civilian Casualty Information, Information Item 12)………… 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Screen (14/14, Civilian Casualty Information, Information Item 13)…………... 
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Final Decision Screen………………………….………………………………..………… 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Instruction Screen………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Questionnaire Screen (1/3)……………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Screen (2/3)……………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 176
Questionnaire Screen (3/3)……………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX B 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
 
 
LOGIT Results for ATTACK in Experiment 1 
 
Variable Odds Ratio Coefficient Z p 
FRAME .671 -.400 -1.27 .103 
TARGET * 1.960 .673 2.10 .018 
HARM ** .460 -.777 -2.41 .008 
Constant **               --- .866 2.75 .003 
*  p < .05      ** p < .01 
Where variables are dichotomous: ATTACK (0 = Do Not Attack and 1 = Attack); FRAME (0 = Losing and 1 = Winning); 
TARGET (0 = Low Value and 1 = High Value); and HARM (0 = Low Harm and 1 = High Harm)
 
 
 
LOGIT Results for ATTACK in Experiment 2 
 
Variable Odds Ratio Coefficient Z p 
FRAME .928 -.075 -.19 .423 
TARGET *** 6.816 1.919 4.75 .000 
HARM * .432 -.840 -2.18 .015 
CCP-0 *** 1.011 .011 3.78 .000 
Constant              --- .002 .01 .498 
*  p < .05      *** p < .001 
Where variables except CCP-0 are dichotomous: ATTACK (0 = Do Not Attack and 1 = Attack); FRAME (0 = Losing and  
1 = Winning); TARGET (0 = Low Value and 1 = High Value); and HARM (0 = Low Harm and 1 = High Harm) 
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